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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses primarily the legal framework related to the publication of 
photographs of and reports on the private lives of celebrities and their children both under German 
and ew Zealand law. The analysis focuses on statutory and common law and provides a 
comparative work. 
The competing rights are the freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Jt is unlikely 
that something that takes place in a public place gives rise to legal liability. Celebrities are 
expected to deal with robust persistence on the part of the media that might otherwise be 
unacceptable. 
This paper suggests that as far as the position of adults is concerned the approach taken 
by New Zealand courts is preferable and no new general tort of intrusion is needed. Current 
limitations imposed by German law are not reasonable and the freedom of expression is not 
adequately guaranteed. This paper also suggests that New Zealand courts should reconsider 
children· s special position and adopt a pro-children approach. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography) 
compri es 16348 words. 
Public figures-Privacy Law-Germany-New Zealand 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
News, gossip and paparazzi. The fight between celebrities and the media, 
especially photographers, is constant. Their relationship can almost be described 
as a Jove-hate relationship. Celebrities need the media, either to promote their new 
album, or film, or fashion collection. However, in their songs famous musicians 
ask for respect of their privacy. 1 In the name of privacy, some are even prepared to 
go beyond what is needed. Actors and performers like Seal, Hugh Grant and Jude 
Law have been caught attacking photographers. Apparently, Jude Law was 
arrested after the attack (and released on bail Jater). 2 These events indicate the 
nature of this volatile relationship. 
The competing rights are the freedom of the press and reporting (as 
specific forms of the freedom of expression)3 and individual's right to control the 
use of their image and privacy rights in general respectively.4 This paper analyses 
primarily the legal framework of relevant German law (including the implications 
of ECtHR' s landmark judgement in Caroline of Hannover v Germany (of 
Hannover) on the German approach) and the situation in New Zealand, focusing 
on both statutory and common law, and provides some comparative aspects.5 In 
particular, the analysis focuses on photographs as "a picture is 'worth a thousand 
1 Lindsay Lohan in "Rumors" (2004); Britney Spears in "Piece of Me" (2007). 
2 Jude Law Arrested over Photographer 'Attack'www.telegraph.co.uk (accessed I May 2009). 
3 For the sake of convenience, this paper refers only to the freedom of expression in general unless 
a reference to the freedom of the press or reporting is necessary. 
4 This paper does not address the rights of celebrities· comparnons in general but limits the 
analysis to the position of children. 
5 Issues of criminal law will not be addressed. This paper does not address the publication of false 
or misleading facts either. 
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words' because it adds to the impact of what the words convey; but it also adds to 
the infom1ation given in those words."6 
While it is important to differentiate between something that happens in a 
private place ("door-stepping"),7 and something that takes place in a public place, 
which is unlikely to give rise to legal liability, generally speaking, celebrities are 
expected to deal with "robust persistence on the part of the media that might 
otherwise be unacceptable."8 
This paper concludes by suggesting that the current limitations imposed by 
German law are not reasonable and freedom of expression is not adequately 
guaranteed. It appears to be that, generally speaking, celebrities' private lives are 
overprotected. In contrary, the situation in New Zealand suggests an adequate pro-
free speech approach. As a matter of fact, present law and existing avenues 
provide sufficient protection of celebrities' privacy from the media and so there is 
no need for a new general tort of intrusion in New Zealand. At the same time, this 
paper suggests that New Zealand courts should take children's special position 
into account and adopt a pro-children approach. 
6 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 [Campbell], para 155 Baroness 
Hale. 
7 Eric Barendt " Privacy and freedom of speech" in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds) 
New Dimensions in Privacy law. International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, New York , 2006) I I, 14. 
8 laws v TV] Network Services Ltd (6 March I 996) Broadcasting Standards Authority 1996-024 
[laws]. 
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11. THE GERMAN APPROACH 
Public figures and their private lives have always been at the centre of 
public discussion, and especially the target of the tabloid press. Only recently the 
German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) published its decision in Andrea Casiraghi 
v RTL Television (Casiraghi v RTL).9 Once again, a member of the Grimaldi 
Family Dynasty had filed a complaint relating to an alleged breach of their 
privacy rights. Princess Caroline of Monaco (Princess Caroline) has long fought 
against her private life becoming published and she has fundamentally contributed 
to the development of celebrities ' rights in Europe. Even the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) 10 and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) 11 heard cases that dealt with photographs showing her private life: 
"'Pure happiness ', 'Caroline ... a woman returning to life', 'Out and about with 
Princess Caroline in Paris ' and 'The kiss. Or: they are not hiding anymore '. "12 
The FCC accepted that "the need for protection has increased as a result of 
developments in camera technology and the availability of small cameras ."13 
However, in this recent case, Casiraghi v RTL, the court dismissed the action and 
took a pro-paparazzi approach. 
9 Andrea Casiraghi v RTL Television (10 March 2009) BGH VI ZR 261 /07 [Casiraghi v RTL]. 
10 See generally : Caroline 11 [1999] IOI BYerfGE 361 (DE) (FCC) [Caroline 11]. 
11 Caroline of Hannover v Germany [2005] 40 EHRR I (Sec ti on Ill , ECHR) [of Hannover v 
Germany]. 
12 Ibid , para 50 ( emphasis added). 
13 Federal Constitutional Court "Standards of constitutional law applying to the admissibility of 
photojournalism concerning the private and everyday life of celebrities" (I 8 March 2008) Press 
Release No 35/08. 
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A. The Individual's Right to Control the Use of Their Image and The Right 
to Privacy 
1. Articles 1 (1) and 2(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany 
At the centre of the disputes is the individual's right to control the use of 
their image. This right is part of the individual's personality rights (Allgemeines 
Personlichkeitsrecht) protected under the German constitution encompassing, 
inter alia, the right to control the use of the image (Recht am eigenen Bild), the 
right to privacy (which is not limited to photographs, Schutz der Privatsphare), 
and the right of infom1ational self-determination (Recht auf informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung). 14 The concept of personality rights was developed through 
case law. Courts ruled that the rights are based on articles 1 (1) and 2(1) of the 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Basic Law). 15 "The scope of 
protection provided by the general right of personality of parents is enhanced by 
articles 6(1) and 6(2) (special protection of family life) of the Basic Law."16 The 
pivotal point is that personality rights are important for every individual's well-
being. As a matter of fact, even public figures "must be able to enjoy a ' legitimate 
expectation' of protection of and respect for their private life." 17 
Individual's right to control the use of their image and the right to privacy 
are inevitably linked when it comes to the publication of photographs of public 
figures. Generally speaking, disputes usually involve photographs of public 
figures in private. Basically, the right to control the use of the image means that 
every individual has the right to decide whether and under which circumstances a 
14 Spickmich.de (23 June 2009) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 196/08 [Spickmich.de], para 28. 
15 Schacht-Leserbrief[l 954] I 3 BGHZ 334, 338 (DE) (FCJ) [Schacht-Leserbriej]. 
16 Caroline 11, above n 10. 
17 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11, para 69. 
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photograph may be taken and published. 18 The right to privacy relates both to 
particular matters that are generally deemed to be private (diary notes, sexuality, 
medical history, confidential communication) and "to a physical space in which 
the individual can recover, relax and also let him- or herself go." 19 This also 
applies to public figures. 20 
In addition to the different aspects of personality rights (the right to control 
the use of the own image, right to privacy), case law also suggests to distinguish 
between different spheres (degrees) of protection: the sphere related to the social 
life (Sozialsphare), private life (Privatsphare) and intimate life (lntimsphare). 21 
The social life sphere addresses matters (photographs) related to individual's 
environment and their being in public, such as their occupation or function. The 
private life sphere encompasses the individual's home and family, holidays,22 or 
illness. 23 The intimate life sphere addresses, inter al ia, issues (photographs) 
related to their sexuality. According to case law publications (photographs) in 
relation to the intimate life enjoy more protection than publications (photographs) 
concerning the private life or social life.24 Indeed, the publication of facts related 
to the intimate life sphere is per se not permissible and unjustifiable. 25 In contrary, 
18 Ernst August of Hannover v Klambt-Verlag GmbH & Cie (6 March 2007) Federal Court of 
Justice VI ZR 53/06, para 5; Das Recht am eigenen Bild (Tei! I) www.presserecht-aktuell.de 
(accessed 19 October 2009). 
19 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para 39 (emphasis added). 
20 Jbid , para 39. 
21 See generally: Spickmich.de, above n 14, para 30. 
22 Oliver Kahn v Gruner + Jahr AG & Co KG (3 July 2007) Federal Court of Justice VJ ZR 
I 64/06 [ Oliver Kahn] , para 13. 
23 Ernst August of Hannover v Heinrich Bauer Zeitschrifien Verlag KG (14 October 2008) Federal 
Court of Justice YI ZR 272/06 [of Hannover v HBZJ , para 20. 
24 Kannibale van Rotenb11rg (26 May 2009) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 191 /08 [van 
Rotenburg] , para 19; Spickmich.de, above n 14, para 31. 
25 Andrea Casiraghi v Burda Senator Verlag GmbH (23 June 2009) Federal Court of Justice Vl ZR 
232/08 [Casiraghi v Burda], para 7. 
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generally speaking, social life-related publications are permissible (subject to a 
strong countervailing interest, such as great harm to the reputation). 26 
Note that individual's personality rights are not deemed to be absolute 
'rights: "General personality rights are guaranteed only within the framework of 
the constitutional order. "27 Part of that constitutional order are the provisions of 
the Copyright Arts Domain Act (CADA) and the freedom of expression.28 
2. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
In addition, article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which contains basic and human rights addressing the signing states 
(such as Gem1any and the United Kingdom), also protects privacy rights and 
family life.29 Article 8 of the ECHR protects the personal sphere and extends to an 
individual's image. 30 The ECtHR accepted that:31 
The guarantee afforded by article 8 ... is primarily intended to ensure the 
development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in 
his [sic] relations with other human beings ... There is . .. a zone of interaction of a 
26 Spickmich.de, above n 14, para 31. 
27 Caroline 11, above n 19, para 89. 
28 See Part JI B Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Reporting and Part JI C Limitations under 
the Copyright Arts Domain Act. 
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 
213 UNTS 222 [ECHR] , art 8; see also: International Covenant on Civi l and Political Rights (19 
December 1966) 999 U TS 17 l [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], art 17; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 ovember 1989) 1577 UNTS 3 [Convention on the 
Rights of the Child] a11 16. The United Kingdom incorporated the ECHR into national law: 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
30 Of Hannover v Germany, above n I I, para 50; Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41 
[Peck] , para 57. 
31 Ibid . 
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person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
'private life'. 
3. Princess Caroline v The Press 
Princess Caroline has long fought against her private life becoming public 
and challenged the press. Indeed, numerous disputes involving her private life 
have contributed to the development of public figures' rights. For instance, in 
March 2007 the FCJ published six decisions involving Princess Caroline and her 
husband fighting against the publication of photographs. 32 She brought also an 
action against Germany before the ECtHR for an alleged breach of her privacy 
rights as guaranteed by article 8 of the ECHR. 33 German courts had denied her 
any protection against the publication of photographs showing the princess in 
public places, such as at a fam1er's market or at a swimming pool. The 
photographs did not involve "harassment or significant press intrusion"34 or the 
intimate life sphere but concerned the sphere related to her private life. Although 
the ECtHR acknowledged the importance of the press, the freedom of expression 
and the crucial role the press plays in a democratic society when dealing with 
matters of public interest, the claim was upheld. The court decided that the 
publication of photographs showing the princess in public places in her daily life 
infringed her right to privacy under article 8 of the ECHR.35 Indeed, it was 
accepted that "an individual's private life can include ordinary activities ... which 
are not public in any sense beyond the fact that they are conducted in a street or 
32 (6 March 2007) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 13/06; (6 March 2007) Federal Court of Justice 
VI ZR 14/06; (6 March 2007) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 50/06; (6 March 2007) Federal 
Court of Justice VI ZR 51 /06; (6 March 2007) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 52/06; (6 March 
2007) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 53/06. 
33 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 . 
34 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446 [Murray] , para 43. 
35 ECHR, above n 29, art 8. 
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some other public place."36 This landmark judgement lead to a change of 
jurisprudence in Gem1any. 37 
B. Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Reporting 
I. Article 5(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
Both freedom of the press and freedom of reporting are protected under 
article 5(1) of the Basic Law. Basically, the article provides that the "freedom of 
the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be 
guaranteed ... there shall be no censorship."38 In of Hannover, the ECtHR held 
that the freedom of expression is not limited "to 'information' or 'ideas' that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference" but 
extends to information "that offend[s], shock[s] or disturb[s]. "39 Indeed, 
"journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or 
even provocation."40 
The freedom of the press includes the right to publish photographs of 
individuals (requiring, however, the media to consider individual's personality 
rights).41 However, the ECtHR acknowledged that "photos appearing in the 
36 Murray, above n 34, para 43. 
37 Ernst August of Hannover v Ehrlich & Sohn GmbH & Co KG (6 March 2007) Federal Court of 
Justice VI ZR 50/06 [of Hanno ver v Ehrlich l]; Caroline of Hannover v Ehrlich & Sohn GmbH & 
Co KG (6 March 2007) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 51 /06 [of Hannover v Ehrlich Ji] see Part II 
C Limitations under the Copyright Arts Domain Act. 
38 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany [Basic Law], art 5(1). 
39 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 58. 
4o Ibid . 
41 Wer wird Millionar? (l l March 2009) Federal Court of Justice I ZR 8/07 [Wer wird Millionar?], 
para 14. 
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tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual harassment which induces in 
the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even 
of persecution."42 Media rights encompass the right to report (in an entertaining 
way) on a celebrity's daily or private life including reports targeting their social 
circles, especially on persons that are close to them ("infotainment", entertainment 
press). 43 As a matter of fact, "the fact that the press fulfills the function of forming 
public opinion does not exclude entertainment from the functional guarantee 
under the Basic Law."44 German courts held on several occasions that 
entertainment "can sometimes even stimulate or influence the fom1ation of 
opinions more than purely factual information."45 The FCC accepted that 
entertainment can also fulfill important social functions. 46 The freedom of the 
press also encompasses the right to advertise the relevant material (as the 
advertising contributes to the dissemination of the information). 47 
Note that the freedom of the press and reporting is inevitably linked with 
the public's legitimate interest to be informed. The media is exercising the 
public's right to know given the right to decide on the content of the publication 
and what is deemed to be of public interest.48 In a landmark judgement the FCC 
held that: 49 
42 Of Hannover v Germany , above n 11 , para 59. 
43 Ibid, para 54; Of Hannover v HBZ, above n 23, para 14; Renate Damm and Klaus Rehbock 
Widerruf, Unterlass11ng 11nd Schadensersatz in den Medien (3 ed, C H Beck, Munich , 2008) , para 
191. 
44 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para 98 . 
45 See generally: Ibid. 
46 Ibid , para 99. 
47 Marlene Dietrich 11 [2002] 151 BGHZ 26, 30 (OE) (FCJ) [Marlene Dietrich 11]; Wer wird 
Millionar?, above n 41, para 28. 
48 See generally: Oliver Kahn , above n 22, para 8; See Part II C I Aspect of contemporary society. 
49 Caroline JI, above n I 0, para I 05 . 
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The kernel of press freedom and the free formation of opinions requires the press 
to have, within legal limits, sufficient margin of manoeuvre to allow it to decide, in 
accordance with its publishing criteria, what the public interest demands, and the 
process of fonning opinion to establish what amounts to a matter of public interest 
[ ... ] entertaining coverage is no exception to these principles. 
However, "it is often in the name of a one-sided interpretation of the ... 
freedom of expression ... that the media invade people's privacy, claiming that 
their readers are entitled to know everything about public figures."50 
Media rights are not absolute. They "find their limits in the provisions of 
general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to 
personal honour,"51 such as the provisions of the CADA, personality rights under 
the civil law or the right to respect for the private and family life under article 8 of 
the ECHR. 52 
2. Article JO of the European Convention on Human Rights 
In addition to article 5(1) of the Basic Law, the freedom of expression is 
protected by article 10 of the ECHR.53 It is this right that has to be balanced 
against individual's right to protection of the private and family life under article 
8 of the ECHR. Both rights are of equal fundamental importance to a democratic 
society.54 
5° Council Resolution (EC) 1165/98 Right to Privacy www.assembly.coe.int (accessed J 
ovember 2009). 
51 Basic Law, above n 38, art 5(2); See Part II C I Aspect of contemporary society. 
52 See Part II C Limitations under the Copyright Arts Domain Act. 
53 ECHR, above n 29, art I O; see also: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above 
n 29, art 19. 
54 Council Resolution (EC) 1165/98 Right to Privacy, above n 50. 
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C. Limitations under the Copyright Arts Domain Act 
Neither individual's personality rights nor media rights are deemed to be 
absolute rights.55 The CADA addresses the right to control the use of the image 
striking the balance between the competing rights at issue.56 Sections 22 and 23 of 
the CADA are deemed to be provisions justifying a limitation of the freedom of 
expression and personality rights.57 Section 22 of the CADA states that generally 
an individual's consent is needed to publish photographs (the personality rights 
under the constitution are not limited to publishing but extend to taking 
photographs). In contrary, section 23(1) of the CADA provides that in some 
circumstances, even where no consent is given, it is permitted to publish 
photographs. For instance, it is permitted to publish photographs related to an 
aspect of contemporary society. However, this does not apply (and the (further) 
publication of the photographs is not covered by the CADA) where a legitimate 
interest of the individual concerned is given. 58 
1. Figures of contemporary society par excellence v relatively public figures 
German case law has always distinguished between figures of 
contemporary society par excellence (absolute Person der Zeitgeschichte) and 
relatively public figures (relative Person der Zeitgeschichte) within the context of 
aspect of contemporary history and granted different degrees of protection 
55 Ernst August of Hannover v Axel Springer Verlag AG (14 October 2008) Federal Court of 
Justice VI ZR 256/06 [of Hannover v Springer]. 
56 Copyright Arts Domain Act 1907 (DE), ss 22, 23. 
57 Of Hannover v HBZ, above n 23, para 12. 
58 Copyright Arts Domain Act, above n 56, s 23(2). 
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according to the classification. An individual considered to be a relatively public 
figure (the accused, victims) would enjoy more protection than a figure of 
contemporary society par excellence (members of royal families, scientists, 
athletes, politicians). According to case law figures of contemporary society par 
excellence are:59 
People who [in contrary to relatively public figures] have not only aroused public 
interest at a certain point on the occasion of a particular historical event but who, 
on account of their status and importance, attract the public's attention in general 
and not just on the odd occasion. 
In contrary, a relatively public figure is someone that is merely temporarily 
involved in public affairs. Public's legitimate interest to be informed on aspects of 
contemporary society involving a relatively public figure is limited to such public 
affairs which made the individual concerned a relatively public figure (making the 
context (the event) and aspect of contemporary society the crucial factors). 60 
Generally speaking, according to the earlier approach, a figure of 
contemporary society par excellence's "right to protection of private life stopped 
at their front door."61 "Even if the constant hounding by photographers made [the] 
daily life difficult, it arose from a legitimate desire to inform the general public."62 
However, the FCJ accepted that even public figures are entitled to respect of their 
privacy. "Outside their home, however, they could not rely on the protection of 
their privacy unless they had retired to a secluded place - away from the public 
59 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para l 06; Abmahnbar (25 June 2009) District Court of Frankfurt 2-03 O 
179/09 [Abmahnbiir]. 
60 Abmahnbdr, above n 59; Arnold Vahrenwald "Photographs and Privacy in Germany" (1994) 6 
Ent LR 205,214. 
61 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 20 referring to Caroline of Monaco v Hubert Burda 
Media GmbH & Co KG (4 February 1993) District Court of Hamburg [of Monaco v HBM]. 
62 Ibid, para 21. 
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eye" (ortliche Abgeschiedenheit).63 Consequently, the FCJ denied an infringement 
in relation to photographs showing the Princess Caroline shopping or bicycling in 
public places and held that the publication of photographs showing the Princess 
Caroline together with her former partner dining at "the far end of a restaurant 
courtyard with the clear aim of being out of the public eye"64 infringed her right to 
privacy as the photographs at issue "had been taken secretly and/or by catching 
unawares a person who had retired to such a place."65 The court accepted that:66 
[J]t was objectively clear to everyone that they [Princess Caroline and her fonner 
partner] wanted to be alone and [ ... ], confident of being away from prying eyes, 
they behaved in a given situation in a manner in which they would not behave in a 
public place. 
Accordingly, the FCC accepted the criterion of a secluded place ("privacy 
is not restricted to the domestic sphere ... seclusion ... is the prerequisite for 
the protection of privacy outside the domestic sphere")67 and stated that:68 
The criterion of a secluded place takes account of the aim, pursued by the general 
right to protection of personality rights, of allowing the individual a sphere, 
including outside the home, in which he does not feel himself to be the subject of 
permanent public attention - and relieves him of the obligation of behaving 
accordingly - and in which he can relax and enjoy some peace and quiet ... it does 
not impose a blanket ban on pictures of the daily or private life of figures of 
contemporary society, but allows them to be shown where they have appeared in 
public. In the event of an overriding public interest in being informed, the freedom 
of the press can even ... be given priority over the protection of the private sphere. 
63 Ibid, para 23; contrast: Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11. 
64 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 23 referring to of Monaco v HBM, above n 61. 
65 Ibid . 
66 Ibid . 
67 Caroline 11, above n l 0, para 42. 
68 Ibid, para 111 . 
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Basically, public figures had to accept to "be photographed at almost any 
time, systematically, and that the photos are then very widely disseminated even if 
... the photos and accompanying articles relate exclusively to details of [their] 
private [ or everyday] life,"69 such as photographs related to public figures on their 
way to the market or on a bicycle. 70 They had to accept the publication of 
photographs showing their daily life in public places as "the public ha[s] a 
legitimate interest in knowing where [they are] staying and how [they behave] in 
public."71 
In of Hannover, the ECtHR doubted whether distinguishing a figure of 
contemporary society par excellence from a relatively public figure or the 
classification itself would be sufficient to protect the individual's private life and 
asked for clear criteria. 72 
Indeed, recent case law suggests a change of jurisprudence.73 It seems that 
German courts have accepted the need for a general case-by-case decision rather 
than granting different degrees of protection based on whether the individual 
concerned is deemed to be a figure of contemporary society par excellence or a 
relatively public figure. In Ernst August of Hannover v Heinrich Bauer 
Zeitschri.ften Ver!ag KG, the FCJ changed the criteria and referred to public 
figures (Person des offent!ichen Jnteresses), politicians, and ordinary person.74 In 
69 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 74. 
70 Ibid , paras 2- I 0. 
71 Ibid, para 23 referring to of Monaco v HBM, above n 61; contrast: Of Hannover v Germanv , , 
above n 11 , para 77. 
72 Jbid, paras 72-75. 
73 Christoph Teichmann "Abschiecl von der absoluten Person der Zeitgeschichte" (2007) NJW 
I 917. 
74 Of Hannover v HBZ, above n 23, para 18. 
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Oliver Kahn v Gruner+ Jahr AG & Co KG, the FCJ referred in its decision to the 
previously so-called figures of contemporary society.75 This new approach is more 
flexible and has been approved by the FCC. 76 However, courts' approach has not 
been uniform. In Abmahnbdr, a recent decision addressing the question whether a 
lawyer, based on its work-related popularity, is deemed to be a public figure, the 
court still applied the old approach and referred to figures of contemporary society 
par excellence and relatively public figures. 77 
This new approach (giving up the classification) seems preferable. 
Referring, however, to the criterion of a secluded place and stating that " they 
behaved [ ... ] in a manner in which they would not behave in a public place"78 
does not give due regard to the fact that although the individuals at issue might 
not have been at the centre of the public ( or restaurant respectively) , they were 
still in a public place. Although the FCC admitted that it is not the individual's 
decision to define a place as part of the protected sphere "but the objective 
characteristics of the place at the time in question,"79 there are still difficulties 
involved. How much seclusion is needed? ls the far end of the restaurant itself 
sufficient (Princess Caroline and her former partner were sitting in the restaurant 
courtyard)? What if the lighting of the restaurant is bright and insufficient to 
provide any kind of privacy? It seems quite clear that the criteria as set out by the 
FCJ seem to be arbitrary. 
75 Oliver Kahn, above n 22, para 9. 
76 Caroline JJJ [2008] 120 BYerfGE 180 (DE) (FCC) [Caroline ll[J . 
77 Abmahnbar, above n 59. 
78 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11, para 23 referring to of Monaco v HBM, above n 61. 
79 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para 43 . 
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2. Aspect of contempora,y society 
It is lawful to publish (without consent), inter alia, photographs related to 
an aspect of contemporary society. 8° Courts have not, however, provided a general 
definition of what aspect of contemporary society is. Case law suggests a broad 
interpretation (giving due regard to the importance of the press), encompassing 
any aspect of general social interest and public importance8 1 and which is not 
limited to historically or politically important events.82 The application of aspect 
of contemporary society is dictated by the legitimate interest of the public. 1t is 
widely held that the public has a legitimate interest to be infom1ed and the press 
has a corresponding right to report on any aspect of general social interest. 83 The 
media has the right to decide what issues are deemed to be aspects of general 
social interest and worthy of reporting.84 Thus, even celebrities' lifestyle or dai Iy 
life could be relevant for discussing an aspect of general social interest. 85 "Many 
people base their choice of lifestyle on their example. They become points of 
crystallisation for adoption or rejection and act as examples or counter-
examples."86 The FCC acknowledged, m relation to figures of contemporary 
society par excellence, that:87 
The public has a legitimate interest in being allowed to judge whether the personal 
behaviour of the individuals in question , who are often regarded as idols or role 
models, convincingly tallies with their behaviour on their official engagements. 
8° Copyright Arts Domain Act, above n 56, s 23 (I); A bmahnbar, above n 59. 
81 Casiraghi v RTL, above n 9, para JO ; Abmahnbar, above n 59. 
82 WerwirdMillioniir?, aboven41 , para 14. 
83 Ernst August of Hannover v WZV Westdeutsche Zeitschriften Verlag GmbH & Co KG (6 March 
2007) Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 13/06, para 14. 
84 Casiraghi v RTL, above n 9, para JO. 
85 See generally: Caroline 111, above n 76, para 60. 
86 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para I 00. 
87 Ibid, para I 07. 
21 
d to 
.eral 
·oad 
smg 
not 
pect 
It is 
,ress 
The 
1eral 
iaily 
1any 
:s of 
nter-
v1 arch 
2 1 
Before ECtHR' s landmark decision in of Hannover the FCJ would 
consider any event an aspect of contemporary society where figures of 
contemporary society par excellence were the target of news reporting (using the 
lift, driving a car)88 and grant protection only where the individual concerned had 
retired in a secluded place. The ECtHR ruled that no seclusion is needed when 
being in public merely for the protection of the privacy (but a case-by-case 
decision based on whether the publication contributes to a debate of general 
interest and the public figure has a legitimate expectation of privacy in that 
particular instance). 89 It seems reasonable to accept that, for instance, the use of a 
lift itself is without more not an aspect of contemporary society. 
Indeed, the FCJ held on several occasions that for purposes of section 
23(1)(1) of the CADA (aspect of contemporary society) a balancing act between 
the freedom of the press (which is inevitably linked with public ' s legitimate 
interest) and the individual's personality rights is needed (where according to the 
earlier approach section 23(2) of the CADA (legitimate interest) was at the centre 
of the balancing exercise). 90 As a matter of fact , according to the approach taken 
in decisions post-of Hannover, not only section 23(2) of the CADA requires a 
balancing act but also for the purposes of aspect of contemporary society in terms 
of section 23(1 )(1) of the CADA a balancing of the competing rights is needed. 
Especially in the world of entertainment there is a need to balance the competing 
rights and, in particular, to respect privacy rights.91 The ECtHR acknowledged 
that "photos appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual 
harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion 
88 See generally: Teichmann, above n 73, 1918. 
89 Of Hannover v Germany, above 11 11 , paras 76-80. 
9° Casiraghi v Burda, above 11 25 , para 7; Wer wird Mi/lionar?, above 11 41 , paras 12, 15; of 
Hannover v HBZ, above 11 23 , para 10. 
91 Of Hannover v Springer, above 11 55 , para 13 . 
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into their private life or even of persecution."92 This new approach 1s more 
flexible and has been approved by the FCC. 93 
Case law suggests to strike the balance context-related on a case-by-case 
decision.94 Hence, while a photograph published within one context might not be 
covered by the provisions of the CADA published within a different context might 
be pern1issible. It is necessary to provide a link to an aspect of contemporary 
society. Thus, photographs ought not to be published merely for the sake of 
satisfying the public's curiosity about celebrities' private lives (severe illnesses,
95 
holidays, 96 or birthday parties). Photographs can not be evaluated separately but 
must be seen in context with the accompanying broadcasting reports and articles 
(which might provide the required contribution to the public opinion and link 
missing in the photographs). 97 It is crucial that the broadcasting reports, articles, 
or photographs are inforn1ative and relevant and have some value that contributes 
to the public opinion or a debate of general interest respectively. 98 When reporting 
on politicians the press might exercise "its vital role of 'watchdog' in a democracy 
by contributing to impart[ing] infornrntion and ideas on matters of public 
interest."99 In of Hannover, the ECtHR, adopting the legitimate expectation of 
privacy approach (where German courts used to apply the criterion of seclusion), 
denied the existence of a corresponding contribution to a political or public debate 
of general interest in terms of reports and the publication of photographs related to 
"activities of a purely private nature such as engaging in sport, out walking, 
92 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 59. 
93 Caroline ill, above n 76. 
94 Casiraghi v Burda, above n 25, paras 7, 14. 
95 Of Hannover v Springer, above n 55. 
96 Of Hannover v Ehrlich 1, above n 37; of Hannover v Ehrlich Il , above n 37 ; Oliver Kahn, above 
n 22; Sabine Christiansen (I July 2008) Federal Court of Justice YI ZR 243/06. 
97 Casiraghi v Burda, above n 25 , para 7. 
98 Casiraghi v RTL, above n 9, para I O; Of Hannover v Springer, above n 55. 
99 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 63. 
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leaving a restaurant or on holiday" 100 where "the sole purpose ... was to satisfy 
the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the applicant's 
private life."101 
While I accept that the classification itself is insufficient to give due regard 
to the competing interests involved, I do not do so with the ECtHR' s general 
approach. The ECtHR seems to be more concerned with the lack of exercising an 
official function than with the general status of the Princess Caroline itself. 102 In 
his concurring opinion, Barreto J accepted that public figures are "all those who 
play a role in public life" regardless of the performance of a function. 103 "Fame 
and public interest inevitably give rise to a difference in treatment of the private 
life.'' 104 
In Wer wird Millionar?, a case dealing with the publication of a 
photograph of the host of the German version of the television quiz show Who 
Wants to Be a Millionaire? on the cover of a quiz review, the FCJ accepted that 
even the caption can be relevant for the value of information of a publication. 105 It 
is crucial whether the press is dealing with the matter of public interest m a 
serious and relevant way contributing to the public opinion. 106 Generally, it is 
irrelevant how famous the individual concerned is as it is more about the value of 
the information. As a matter of fact, even where celebrities with a high degree of 
fame are at the centre of the reports, the reports have to have some inforn1ational 
value contributing to the public opinion. 107 Where the accompanying text's only 
100 Ibid, para 61. 
IOI Ibid. 
102 Ibid , paras 61-75. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Wer wird Millioniir?, above n 41 , para 18. 
106 Ibid, para 20. 
107 Oliver Kahn , above n 22, para 9. 
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purpose 1s to justify an arbitrary publication of a public figure's image, a 
contribution to the public opinion is to deny. 108 As a matter of fact, in Wer wird 
Mi!lionar?, the FCJ held that given the marginal value of information contained in 
the caption (Gunther Jauch demonstrates with the show Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire? how exciting quiz can be) lacking any other information the high 
degree of fame of the public figure concerned does not justify the publication. ln 
that instance the only purpose of the text was to publish the public figure's image 
(without consent). The text (in context with the photograph at issue) conveyed 
nothing more than the (public) inforn1ation that the individual concerned is the 
host of the show and that the show is exciting lacking any contribution to the 
public opinion. As a matter of fact, section 23(1 )(1) of the CADA does not apply 
where the public figure's photograph is used for promotion purposes only without 
providing any additional contribution to the public opini011.109 However, where 
the press is reporting on a public figure and the work is contributing to the public 
opinion it is admissible to use the public figure ' s image for promotion purposes 
(for instance on the cover) . 110 This gives due regard to the constitutional guarantee 
of the freedom of the press and reporting as the advertising is contributing to the 
dissemination of the infonnation. 111 However, this does not apply where the use 
suggests that the public figure is the face of the corresponding product suggesting 
an identification with the product or a likelihood of association of general 
nature. 11 2 
It seems that in Casiraghi v RTL the court was right when deciding that the 
death of Prince Ranier Ill of Monaco was an aspect of contemporary society. The 
media were allowed to discuss within this given context the plaintiffs future role 
iox Of Hannover v HBZ, above n 23 , para 16. 
109 Wer wird Millioniir?, above n 41 , para 26 . 
110 Marlene Dietrich 11, above n 47. 
11 1 See Part II B Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Reporting. 
112 Wer wird Millioniir?, above n 41 , paras 31-32 ; Marlene Dietrich 11, above n 4 7, para 11. 
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within the principality of Monaco and publish photographs showing the plaintiff 
in his spare time wearing casual wear. 113 
3. Legitimate interest 
In addition to the required balance of the competing rights (the right to 
control the use of the image and freedom of expression) under section 23(1) of the 
CADA for the question whether an issue of contemporary society is concerned at 
all, section 23(2) of the CADA provides that a legitimate interest of the individual 
concerned prevents the (further) publication of the photographs requmng an 
additional balancing test. Case law does not provide a general definition of 
legitimate interest. Photographs are to be assessed in relation to the accompanying 
reports. It was held that an individual's legitimate expectation to be not the target 
of the press is not limited to what happens in a private place. 11 4 For instance, 
individual's rights hold if the photographs were taken while being in isolated 
places or at home (using long lens photography), 115 dining out and sitting in 
reserved parts of the restaurant, 116 where photographs relate to severe illnesses , 117 
are used for advertising purposes, or have been manipulated.' 18 An infringement is 
also given where the photograph relates to a situation in which the individual can 
not control their being (at a funeral). 119 
113 Casiraghi v RTL, above n 9, paras 13- I 6. 
114 See generally: Of Hannover v H BZ, above n 23, para 17. 
115 Casiraghi v RTL, above n 9, para 15 . 
11 6 Caroline 11, above n I 0. 
11 7 Of Hannover v Springer, above n 55. 
118 Dr Dr S v Ver/agsgruppe Hande/sblatt GmbH (14 February 2005) BVerfG I BvR 240/04. 
119 Damm, above n 43, para 289. 
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Both the FCJ and the FCC accepted that no protection ought to be granted 
where the publication concerns public figure's own publicly disclosed (intimate) 
infom1ation. 120 In addition, personality rights do not serve the individual's interest 
of the commercialisation of their own image or person respectively (to exclusively 
contract on the publication of private details). Individuals do not have the right "to 
be portrayed by others only as he or she views him- or herself or only as he or she 
wants to be perceived. " 121 
Generally speaking, however, the FCJ seems to apply this provision 
primarily to notorious paparazzi shots considering the manner the information 
were obtained ( covert photographing or by way of prying) whereas the ECtHR 
seems to adopt a broader interpretation. 122 The FCC doubted whether "the mere 
fact of photographing the person secretly or catching them unawares can be 
deemed to infringe their privacy outside the home." 123 
D. The Association of State Media Authorities for Broadcasting and The 
German Press Council 
I. The Association of State Media Authorities for Broadcasting 
According to the Basic Law the individual states are responsible for the 
broadcasting (standards). No central authority or code exists. The Association of 
State Media Authorities for Broadcasting (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienansta!ten) coordinates the complaints procedure and forwards the 
complaints to the respective authority depending on whether public television and 
120 See generally: von Rotenburg, above n 24, para 26. 
121 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 33; von Rotenburg, above n 24, para 26. 
122 See generally:Teichmann, above n 73, 1919-1920. 
123 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para 113. 
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radio (to the broadcaster itself) or commercial television and radio (to the 
respective state media authority for broadcasting) are concemed. 124 The 
broadcasting standards address, inter alia, the protection of minors and the law in 
general but not privacy rights in particular. In addition, there are different 
committees and associations dealing with broadcasting standards. 125 
2. The German Press Council 
The Gem1an Press Council (Deutscher Presserat, GPC) is an independent 
self-regulatory body advocating the freedom of the press and dealing with 
complaints alleging a breach of the principles contained in the Press Code 
(Pressekodex). 126 Both the print media and online publications providing a 
journalistic and editorial content are subject to the jurisdiction of the GPC. 127 The 
Press Code contains 16 principles (responsible journalism, research standards) and 
protects, inter alia, privacy rights of individuals. An interference with privacy 
rights of public figures might be justified in the name of a legitimate public 
interest (depending on the context). 128 In addition, section 9 of the Press Code 
protects the individual's dignity (appropriate selection of photographs). For 
instance, the GPC held that the publication of the name and the photograph of a 
minor killing 15 people at a school (a public figure given the circumstances of the 
crime) does not infringe privacy rights. 129 The press is expected to publish the 
124 Programmbeschwerde www.programmkritik.de (accessed 11 November 2009). 
125 Association of State Media Authorities for Broadcasting in Germany www.alm.de (accessed 11 
ovember 2009). 
126 The Gennan Press Council www.presserat.de (11 ovember 2009). 
127 Complaints Procedure of the German Press Council , s I . 
128 Press Code, principle 8(2) . 
129 Pressemitteilungen 2009 www.presserat.info (accessed 11 November 2009). 
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corresponding reprimands. Compensation can not be awarded. 130 There is no right 
to appeal but complainants might apply for a review. 131 
E. Children's Position 
Note that a "child has his [sic] own right to respect for his [sic] privacy 
distinct from that of his [sic] [famous] parents." 132 Gem1an courts have for a long 
time protected children's privacy rights (under articles 1(1), 2(1) and 6(1)(2) of 
the Basic Law) 133 regardless of the need of a sphere of seclusion in public places 
and accepted their special position: "children need special protection because they 
still have to develop into responsible persons." 134 In its landmark decision in 
Caroline JI, concerning, inter alia, photographs of Princess Caroline paddling with 
her daughter or comforting her son, the FCC accepted that "this need for 
protection extends as well to the protection of children from threats posed by the 
interest of the media and the consumers of media images of children."135 
However, no protection is needed where the parents deliberately decide to attend 
public events together with their children exposing them to the media 
environment or where their children are at the centre of corresponding 
functions. 136 
13° Complaints Procedure of the German Press Council, s 15 ; Press Code, principle 16. 
131 Complaints Procedure of the German Press Council, s 16. 
132 Murray, above n 34, para 16. 
133 See also: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 29, art 17; Convention 
on the Rights of the Child , above n 29, arts 16, 40(2)(vii) , ECHR, above n 29, art 8. 
134 Caroline JI, above n 10, paras 45-47; see also: Charlotte Casiraghi 1 (28 September 2004) 
Federal Court of Justice VI ZR 302/03 . 
135 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para 45 . 
136 See generally: Ibid, para 47. 
29 
o right 
nvacy 
a long 
1(2) of 
places 
.e they 
10n m 
g with 
~d for 
by the 
~n. "I 35 
attend 
media 
mding 
vent ion 
r 2004) 
29 
In addition, on many other occasions German courts stated that, generally 
speaking, children's rights outweigh, such as where the media published 
photographs of Princess Caroline's baby taken in a public place. 137 Children of 
famous parents are also entitled to a space free of surveillance by the media (in 
public places) necessary for the free development of their own personality. 138 In 
Charlotte Casiraghi, the FCC held that the protection is not restricted to negative 
publications and accepted that photographs of Princess Charlotte Casiraghi with 
her mother Princess Caroline which were taken at the opening night of the ballett 
Geil pour oeil in Monaco and included the caption The same sensual mouth ... the 
same proud look infringed the child's rights. 139 Note that at the centre of the 
dispute was not the photograph itself (as Princess Charlotte Casiraghi participated 
deliberately at the public event) but the caption. The content was held to be 
inappropriate to be attributed to a child. Courts accepted that even children of 
famous parents, like any ordinary children, have the right to be accompanied by 
their famous parents in public places without being the target of the press merely 
because of the presence of their parents or the sake of satisfying public ' s 
curiosity. 140 As a matter of fact, children are entitled to a private and everyday life 
with their famous parents outside their home and domestic sphere respectively 
without any media intrusion. 
It seems, however, that the FCJ has recently adopted a slightly different 
approach. In F and H Beckenbauer v Hubert Burda Media GmbH & Co KG, 
Franz Beckenbauer, a famous former soccer player and coach, and his wife sought 
to protect their children (five and nine years old) from any media intrusion 
regardless of the context of (future) photographs for the time their children are 
137 Alexandra of Hannover v Gong Verlag GmbH & Co KG [2004] 160 BGHZ 298 (DE) (FCJ). 
138 Charlotte Casiraghi 11 (14 February 2005) Federal Constitutional Court I BvR 1783/02. 
139 Ibid. 
140 See generally: Names suppressed (31 March 2000) Federal Constitutional Court I BvR 
1454/97, para 4. 
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under age. 141 The FCJ, however, denied the existence ofa general right to prohibit 
the taking of photographs of children (Genera/verbal). The importance of the 
freedom of expression requires a balancing of the competing rights based on a 
case-by-case decision (regardless of whether the children involved are under age). 
The court acknowledged that children need a different degree of protection than 
adults but denied to accept that a balancing exercise is redundant wherever 
children are the target of the press, and especially where future photographs are 
concerned and the context of their publication is not known yet. There might be 
instances where publications involving children are justified by a legitimate public 
interest. As matter of fact, a general prohibition of the publication of photographs 
which might last many years is not a justified limitation of the freedom of the 
press. 
F. Quo Vadis Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Reporting? 
Recent developments are not convmcmg and limit media rights in an 
arbitrary and unjustifiable manner (the publication of a photograph showing 
Princess Caroline on a public street during her holidays related to an article on 
letting her holiday villa was held to be of general public interest given the current 
economic downtown: "Even the rich and beautiful live economically.") 142 The 
ECtHR ' s approach in of Hannover might be due to " the campaign of harassment 
conducted against her [the Princess] by the German media" 143 and celebrities are 
often under the spotlight and it is necessary to award them some privacy even in 
public places, yet, limitations on the freedom of expression ought to be justified. 
lndeed, instances granting public figures a right to privacy in public must be 
limited given the fundamental importance of the freedom of expression. I admit 
141 F and H Beckenbauer v Hubert Burda Media GmbH & Co KG (6 October 2009) Federal Court 
of Justice VI ZR 314/08 and VJ ZR 315/08. 
142 Caroline 111, above n 76, paras I 02-106. 
143 Murray, above n 34, para 59. 
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that a public figure's dinners or holidays are, without more, not issues to be 
considered aspects of contemporary society. But I am reluctant to accept that 
reports and photographs involving corresponding matters infringe a public 
figure's right to privacy. Although German courts accept that the work of the 
infotainment press is covered by the freedom of expression and that in principle, 
the quality of reports is irrelevant, it seems that the courts are not giving due 
regard to the fact that recent developments could possibly interfere with the work 
of the tabloid press and impact the institution tabloid press. The entertainment 
press is, by definition, supposed to entertain and to satisfy public ' s curiosity (at 
least to some degree). It seems doubtful to require within this context a 
contribution to a debate of general interest. In addition, although the current 
approach includes a general case-by-case decision where media interests are also 
to be addressed, the German approach is too formalistic and based on casuistry 
(general personality rights, right to control the use of the own image, right to 
privacy, spheres of protection, aspect of contemporary society, legitimate interest, 
ECHR, international instruments). 
I must admit that the early approach taken by the courts pre-of Hannover is 
preferable (although the change towards public figures in general seems 
preferable). The situation was clear: In principle, a public figure's "right to 
protection of private life stopped at their front door." 144 As accepted by the ECtHR 
"the criterion of spatial isolation, although apposite in theory, is in reality too 
vague and difficult for the person concerned to determine in advance." 145 In 
addition, it is difficult for the media itself to decide ad hoe whether the individuals 
concerned in that particular instance are surrounded and protected by the sphere of 
seclusion. However, although the criterion of seclusion gives rise to concern it 
imposes less limitations on the freedom of the press than the current approach. It 
144 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 , para 19 referring to of Monaco v HBM, above n 61. 
145 Ibid , para 75. 
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allows the press to report on public figures m public places (unless the 
circumstances justify a seclusion). 
Being at the centre of the public is part of the game. However, the freedom 
of expression ought to be limited where the individual's life or health 1s 
endangered and the surveillance, monitoring and media intrusion assume to 
alarming proportions (significant harassment and intrusion), such as in the case of 
the Princess of Wales. The pivotal point seems to be that a public figure can not 
expect to be treated as an ordinary person. In his concurring opinion in of 
Hannover, Zupancic J hit the mark with his clear-cut statement: 146 
[W]ho willingly steps onto the public stage cannot claim to be a private person 
entitled to anonymity. Royalty, actors, academics, politicians, ... perform whatever 
they perform publicly. They may not seek publicity, yet, by definition, their image 
is to some extent public property. 
It seems reasonable, however, to accept the need for a special protection 
for children and to advocate corresponding developments (and to accept 
corresponding limitations of the freedom of the press). 
Ill. THE SITUATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand law does not recognise an individual's right to control the 
use of their image or a general right to privacy but deals with the issues arising in 
this context mainly under the tort of breach of privacy. In addition, both the 
standards contained in the Codes of Broadcasting Practice and the principles by 
the NZPC address privacy rights. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
146 Of Hannover v Germany, above n l 0, para 96. 
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(BoRA) does not contain a general right to privacy but the right to freedom of 
expression. 147 
A. Analysing the Legal Framework 
1. Privacy Act 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 deals primarily with the collection and disclosure of 
personal information, such as the publication of an image. However, the Privacy 
Act 1993 excludes, "in relation to its news activities," any news medium 148 based 
on news media's "special role in a democratic society."149 News activities concern 
news and current affairs. 150 ln Talley Family v National Business Review, 
Bathgate J ruled that ordinary meaning is to be given to news and current affairs: 
"what is going on or what may happen." 151 Hence, the Privacy Act 1993 does not 
apply where private lives of celebrities are the target of news reporting. 
147 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
148 The Privacy Act 1993 applies to Radio New Zealand Ltd and Television New Zealand Ltd in 
relation to principles 6 (access to personal information) and 7 ( correction of personal information), 
Privacy Act 1993, s 2(1). 
149 Talley Family v National Business Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 72 (CRT) [Talley]; John Burrows 
and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (5 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2005) 
275. 
150 Privacy Act 1993 , s 2(1) . 
151 Talley, above n 149. 
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2. Tort of breach of privacy 
(a) Jn public places 
In terms of publication of photographs taken in public places without the 
consent of the person concerned, the leading case in New Zealand is Hosking v 
Run ting (Hosking) , confirming the existence of an independent tort of privacy (the 
case involved the publication of photographs of the children of a well-known host 
taken on a public street.). 152 However, cases such as Tucker v News Media 
Ownership Ltd, 153 Bradley v Wingnut Films, 154 P v D, 155 and L v G156 have 
contributed to this development. 
Basically, the test in Hosking was a two-step test. 157 First, "the existence of 
facts in respect of which there is reasonable expectation of privacy" is required (a 
test that was also suggested by Zupancic J in his concurring opinion in of 
Hannover). 158 "Private facts are those not known to the world at large, but they 
may be known to some people, or even a particular class." 159 In addition, it is 
necessary that publicity is "given to those private facts that would be considered 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person." 159 Note that also the manner, 
that is the "extent and tone of a publication,"160 might be relevant for the highly 
offensiveness test. "Liability is limited to "publicity that is truly humiliating and 
152 Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 ZLR 1 [Hosking]. 
153 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716. 
154 Bradley v Wingnut Films [ 1993] I NZLR 415 [Bradley]. 
155 p v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
156 L v G [2002] OCR 234. 
157 Hosking, above n 152, para 117 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
158 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 . 
159 Andrews v TVNZ (15 December 2006) HC AK CIV 2004-404-3536 [Andrews] , para 28. 
160 Ibid , para 51. 
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distressful or otherwise harmful to the individual concerned." 161 Indeed, in 
Hosking, Gault J noted that "the photographs taken ... do not disclose anything 
more than could have been observed by any member of the public ... on that 
particular day." 162 Hence, "publicity, even extensive publicity, of matters which, 
although private, are not really sensitive should not give rise to legal liability."163 
Note that it was accepted that a defence of legitimate public concern exists (but 
something that is merely of general interest to the public is insufficient). 164 
Generally speaking, case law in New Zealand suggests that "something that 
happens on a public street is unlikely to give rise to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy."165 As a matter of fact, there are no general restrictions on photographing 
or writing about what happens in a public place. 166 Note, however, that national 
courts have never expressly adopted the United States approach accepting the lost 
of privacy rights of public figures based on consent, the "personalities and affairs" 
involved as public facts, and legitimate public interest. 167 
ln Andrews v TVNZ (and in Hosking itself), however, the court accepted 
that there might be instances where the individual concerned is entitled "to 
protection from additional publicity, although the relevant circumstances arose in 
public, and were observed, or were observable, by those in the immediate 
161 Hosking, above n 152, para 126 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
162 Ibid,para 164. 
163 Ibid, para 98. 
164 See generally: Andrews, above n 159, paras 80-81. 
165 Private in public and seclusion in company: Some new boundaries in the Law of Privacy 
www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz (accessed 13 May 2009); see generally: Burrows, above n 149,286. 
166 Hosking, above n 152; New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper 19 - Privacy: Concepts and 
issues. Review of the Law of Privacy Stage J (Wellington, 2008) [NZLC SP 19] para 8.66. 
167 see: Hosking, above n 152, para 120; contrary: Barendt, above n 7, 17. 
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vicinity" 168 (mentioning Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd (Campbell) 169 
and Peck v United Kingdom (Peck)). 170 It was held that the conversation between 
a couple (such as the wife's comments that she loves her husband and her 
question where she was), immediately after a car accident on a public road and 
while still being trapped in their car, is deemed to be of private (intimate) nature 
establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy (although the publication itself 
was not found to be highly offensive). 171 
Similarly, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of New Zealand stated 
that the public place is not "some kind of hard edged exclusion zone" 172 and 
suggested to respect, subject to a legitimate public interest, the privacy of public 
figures and their families: "Public figures are, after all, human beings who have 
private lives deserving respect . .. there should [ not] be a reduced expectation of 
privacy on the part of families of public figures merely through a familial 
relationship." 172 
(b) From public places 
Where, for instance, photographs are taken with a telephoto lens of a 
celebrity lying naked in their garden, it is likely that the publication of the 
corresponding photographs (takenf,wn a public place) gives rise to legal liability 
under common law, although it seems that the New Zealand Law Commission 
168 Andrews, above n 159, para 31 (emphasis added); see generall y: NZLC SP19, above n 166, 
para 8.66. 
169 Campbell, above n 6. 
!70 Peck, above n 30. 
171 Andrews, above n 159, paras 65-66. 
172 Submission by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on the Law Commission's Issues Paper 
Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies (NZLC IPl4) www.privacy.org.nz (accessed J July 
2009). 
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(NZLC), unlike its earlier approach ("covert filming of people in intimate 
situations, and distribution of the images, will ... always constitute an invasion of 
privacy"), 173 suggests that the individual concerned might also not succeed in the 
tort of privacy, where the person "is clearly a person well known to the public" 
and as their "leisure time may be the subject of legitimate public interest given 
[their] prominence."174 I must admit that I disagree with this latter approach. The 
majority in Hosking clearly accepted the existence of a tort of privacy. In addition, 
although it might be arguable whether "something that happens on a public street 
is unlikely to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy,"175 generally 
speaking, it is hard to believe that, for purposes of the work of the tabloid press, 
there can be a legitimate public interest where something happens in a private 
place (no matter how well known the person might be and the nature of the 
information). Exceptions might include instances where the individual commits 
serious offences in their backyard ( establishing a legitimate public interest) or it is 
something that can be seen from a public place (due to a lack of any visual 
protection or an insufficient fence). "It is not unlawful to photograph [or to film] 
someone's private property . . . as . . . there can hardly be any expectation of 
privacy in terms of what can actually be seen from the street." 176 
(c) Still lawful to take photographs in public places? 
In R v Rowe, a case concerning the taking (and not the publication) of 
photographs of high school girls walking down the street, the defendant was 
convicted under the Summary Offences Act 1981 ( offensive behaviour in a public 
173 ew Zealand Law Commission Study Paper 15 - Intimate Covert Filming (Wellington, 2004) 
[NZLC SP 15] 13 ( emphasis added). 
174 NZLC SPl9, above n 166, para 8.104. 
175 Private in public and seclusion in company: Some new boundaries in the Law of Privacy, above 
n I 65 ( emphasis added) . 
176 TVNZ v K W(l8 December 2008) HC AK CIV 2007-485-001609 [TVNZ vK W] , para 62. 
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place) 177 although, generally speaking, New Zealand case law suggests that 
"something that happens on a public street is unlikely to give rise to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy."178 Similar to Hosking, the photographs revealed nothing 
more than could have been seen by anyone on that day and nothing seems to be 
unlawful to take photographs of something that happens in a public place. 
However, it seems that time, place and manner in this instance (high school girls 
as the subject of the photographs, covert photographing from a van, voyeuristic 
behaviour, no legitimate interest) were of essential importance for the decision. 
179 
The Court held that "the furtive or covert nature of the behaviour spoke for 
itself."180 Interestingly (and odd enough), it seems that the outcome might have 
been different if the photographer had been a paparazzi (with a legitimate interest 
in taking photographs) intending to publish the photographs, such as the 
professional photographer in Hosking. 181 Paul Roth noted that the decision 
"indirectly gives people a right to privacy in public places under the criminal law 
where no similar right exists in similar circumstances under civil law."182 I must 
admit that I do not think that R v Rowe gives individuals a general right to privacy 
in public places. I rather suggest that the decision merely gives individuals a right 
to be protected from any offensive behaviour in public places - "simply the 
freedom to use and enjoy the public place."183 
177 R v Rowe (18 April 2005) CA 374/04 [R v Rowe]; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was 
declined: Rowe v R [2005] NZSC 40; Summary Offences Act 1981, s 4( I )(a). 
178 Private in public and seclusion in company: Some new boundaries in the Law of Privacy, above 
n 165; see generally: Burrows, above n 149,286. 
179 R v Rowe, above n 177, para 46. 
180 Ibid, para 34. 
181 See generally: Paul Roth "Unlawful Photography in Public Places: the New Zealand 
Position" (2006) I l PLPR 213 . 
182 Ibid. 
183 R v Rowe, above n 177, para 22. 
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(d) The United Kingdom approach 
A different approach was taken by English Courts. Note that the English 
common law does not recognise a tort of privacy, and cases are resolved, for 
instance, on the tort of breach of confidence. 184 
Campbe1!185 concerned the publication of photographs (and articles 
disclosing details) of the model Naomi Campbell showing her leaving a meeting 
of Narcotics Anonymous (her status was described as "a household name, 
nationally and internationally ... her face is instantly recognisable ... whatever she 
does and wherever she goes is news"). 186 The supermodel has always publicly 
denied being drug addicted. 187 The court upheld the claim. Lord Hope stated that 
"the question is what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if ... 
placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity."188 
The test is whether the individual concerned has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy ("whether article 8 [of the ECHR] is in principle engaged")189 taking into 
account all circumstances of the individual case (consent, nature of published 
facts, nature and purpose of intrusion, effect on individual). 190 If there is such a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information at issue, the right 
to privacy and freedom of expression will be balanced (considering, inter alia, the 
184 Campbell, above n 6, para 82 Lord Hope, paras 132-133 Baroness Hale; Barendt, above n 7, 
12-13 ; Raymond Wacks "Why there will never be an English common law privacy tort" in 
Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds) New Dimensions in Privacy Law. international 
and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006) 7. 
185 Campbell, above n 6. 
186 Ibid , para I. 
187 Mike Hosking and Naomi Campbell develop pnvacy & confidentiality law 
www.wigleylaw.com (accessed 25 July 2009). 
188 Campbell, above n 6, para 99. 
189 Murray, above n 34, para 49. 
190 Ibid, para 36. 
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highly offensiveness of a publication). 191 Baroness Hale said: "The activity 
photographed must be private. If this had been ... a picture of Campbell going 
about her business in a public street, there could have been no complaint," 192 and 
referred to Naomi's public role :193 
She makes a substantial part of her living out of being photographed looking 
stunning in designer clothing. Readers will obviously be interested to see how she 
looks if and when she pops out to the shops for a bottle of milk . 
The court also addressed the importance the way a story is presented and 
whether the details and photographs contribute to the story: "A picture is 'worth a 
thousand words' because it adds to the impact of what the words convey; but it 
also adds to the information given in those words." 194 As a matter of fact, there 
might be cases, in which "the addition of salacious details or intimate photographs 
is disproportionate and unacceptable. The latter, even if accompanying a 
legitimate disclosure of the sexual relationship, would be too intrusive and 
demeaning." 195 
Interestingly, in Hosking itself, Gault and Blanchard JJ mentioned Peck, 196 
a case concerning the publication of footage and photographs of Peck attempting 
to commit suicide, and Campbell197 as exceptional cases for the existence of 
privacy rights of a person photographed in public places. 198 Unlike the situation in 
Hosking, Campbell and Peck concerned the publication of embarrassing and 
19 1 Campbell, above n 6, para I 12 Lord Hope; Murray, above n 34, paras 27-30, 49. 
192 Campbell, above n 6, para 154 Baroness Hale . 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid, para l 55 Baroness Hale. 
195 Ibid , para 60 Lord Hoffmann. 
196 Peck, above n 30. 
197 Campbell, above n 6. 
198 Hosking, above n l 52, para l 64. 
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humiliating facts. Generally speaking, it seems that, at least as far as the position 
of adults is concerned, the situation in New Zealand and the United Kingdom is 
similar. 
In Murray v Big Pictures UK Ltd (Murray), 199 a case dealing with 
photographs of JK Rowling's child taken in a public place, though, unlike 
Campbell and Peck but similar to Hosking, not concerning the publication of 
private facts, the court took a different approach than the one related to adults in 
Campell and Peck, and the claim was upheld (consistent with the approach taken 
by the ECtHR in of Hannover). The court discussed a child's special position and 
Lord Clarke admitted that "the photographs showed no more than could be seen 
by anyone in the street but, once published, they would be published to a 
potentially large number of people."200 As a matter of fact, the position of a child 
is a different one justifying a different approach.201 Children are more vulnerable 
and do not have a choice when it comes to media attention and their public role. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child expressly addresses a child's privacy 
rights and the right to be protected against any interference.202 However, in 
Hosking, the court did not see the need to address children's special protection: 
"We cannot see any real harm in it."203 
199 Murray, above n 34. 
200 Ibid, para 50. 
201 See generally: Redmond Kirwan-Jones "Hosking v Runting & Murray v Big Pictures Ltd. 
Privacy rights of the Child in the UK & NZ 'No harm in it'?" (LLB(Hons) Seminar Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2009). 
202 Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 29, art 16. 
203 Hosking, above n 152, para 165 Gault P. 
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B. The Broadcasting Standards Authority and The New Zealand Press 
Council 
I. The Broadcasting Standards Authority 
(a) About the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) is an independent Crown 
entity established under the Broadcasting Act 1989.204 The authority ensures the 
development and observance of broadcasting standards and deals, inter alia, with 
complaints about alleged breaches of programme standards by broadcasters 
(television, radio) made under the Broadcasting Act 1989.205 Although the BSA is 
deemed to be a specialist tribunal offering guidance to the courts in media issues 
(yet its decisions are not binding),206 the BSA needs to some degree also guidance 
from the courts (when interpreting the BoRA). 
Programme standards (excluding advertisements)207 are subject to section 
4 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 (such as broadcasters' responsibility for 
programmes consistent with the privacy of the individual)2°8 and the (voluntary) 
codes of broadcasting practice, such as the Free-to-Air Television Code of 
Broadcasting Practice (Free-to-Air Television Code) or the Radio Code of 
Broadcasting Practice (Radio Code) (issued and approved by the BSA according 
to the Broadcasting Act 1989). 
204 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 20. 
205 Jbid , s 2l(l)(a)-(c) , (e) , (f) . 
206 See generally: Andrews, above n 159, para 96; NZLC SPl9, above n 166, para 8.62. 
207 Advertising Standards Authority. 
208 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4(1)(c) . 
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Courts have accepted the BSA 's reliance on United States' case law due to 
the lack of extended development of New Zealand authority on privacy law to 
guide the BSA.209 In TVNZ Ltd v K Wet al, the court accepted that the reliance on 
United States' case law on the tort of invasion of privacy is still permissible to 
interpret the privacy principles contained in the codes of broadcasting practice.210 
Note that the BSA has only limited power to award compensation (up to 
$5000 and only in privacy-related matters) and costs.211 The decisions of the BSA 
can be appealed to the High Court (which is then the final decision).212 In 
addition, there is the possibility to file an application for judicial review of a 
decision of the BSA (this decision of the High Court can be appealed to the Court 
of Appeal).213 
(b) The Broadcasting Act 1989, codes and standards 
Programme standards are set out in the Broadcasting Act 1989 and the 
codes of broadcasting practice. Each code contains standards and corresponding 
guidelines. Note that the guidelines are not binding but "are included to provide 
interpretative assistance for broadcasters."214 As a matter of fact, "a programme 
which does not adhere to the letter of a particular guideline may not be in breach, 
depending on the programme's overall compliance with the relevant standard."215 
209 TVNZ v K W, above n 176; TV3 Network Services v Broadcasting Standards Authority [ 1995] 2 
NZLR 720 [TV3 v BSA]. 
210 TVNZ Ltd v KW, above n 176, para 53. 
211 BroadcastingAct 1989,ss 13 , 16. 
212 Ibid, SS 18, 19. 
213 Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 4, 11. 
214 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, introduction. 
215 Ibid. 
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Both section 4(1 )( c) of the Broadcasting Act 1989 and standard 3 of the 
Free-to-Air Television Code and Radio Code require expressly that programme 
standards are consistent with "the privacy of the individual."21 6 The BSA is 
required to ensure that broadcasters comply with their obligations under section 4 
of the Broadcasting Act 1989.217 The privacy standard is aimed at protecting the 
interests of the individual from interferences whereas the remaining standards 
address primarily community-related interests.218 Note that the privacy principles 
apply only once the material has been broadcast: "Invasive information-gathering 
alone will not be a breach of the privacy standard."219 For instance, similar to the 
test in Hosking, it is inconsistent with an individual's privacy to disclose private 
facts , "where the disclosure is highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person ."220 In addition, privacy principle 3(a) protects individual's interest in 
solitude or seclusion: "It is inconsistent with an individual's privacy to allow the 
public disclosure of material obtained by intentionally interfering, in the nature of 
prying, with that individual's interest in solitude or seclusion," where the intrusion 
is "highly offensive to an objective reasonable person ."22 1 The relevant factors to 
be considered for the highly offensive-test include the means of (covert filming 
and recording) and the motive for the intrusion:222 
216 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4(l)(c). 
217 Ibid , s 21. 
218 Claudia Geiringer and Steven Price "Moving from Self-Justification to Demonstrable 
Justification - the Bill of Rights and the Broadcasting Standards Authority" in Jeremy Finn and 
Stephen Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, Legislation (LexisNexis NZ Ltd, Wellington, 2008) 332. 
219 Benson v Far North Cable TV Ltd et al (14 August 2006) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
2006-054; Steven Price Media Minefield: A Journalists· Guide to Media Regulation in New 
Zealand (New Zealand Journalists Training Organisation , Wellington , 2007) J 07. 
22° Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3, pnvacy 
principle I (emphasis added), reproduced in Appendix B. 
221 Ibid, privacy principle 3(a), reproduced in Appendix B. 
222 TVNZ v K W, above n 176, paras 66, 67 quoting Shulman v Group W Productions ( J 998) 995 p 
2d 469, 472 (CA S Ct). 
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The mere fact that the intruder was in pursuit of a 'story' does not ... generally 
justify an ... intrusion ... offensiveness depends as well on the particular method 
of investigation ... At one extreme, 'routine techniques · such as asking questions 
of people ... could rarely, if ever, be deemed an actionable intrusion ... At the 
other extreme, violation of well-established legal areas of physical or sensory 
privacy - trespass into a home or tapping a personal telephone line ... - could 
rarely, if ever, be justified by a reporter 's need to get the story. 
In MacDonald v The Radio Network Ltd, the BSA stated that prying means 
"inquiring impertinently into the affairs of another person."223 Privacy principle 3 
is not limited to the disclosure of private facts, but applies to facts in general.224 In 
addition, in Balfour v Television New Zealand Ltd, the BSA accepted that privacy 
principle 3 applies also to "situations where a broadcaster has entered onto a 
person's land, ... irrespective of whether the occupier was present or shown in the 
broadcast."225 "Privacy principle 3 suggests an element of deception ... [which] is 
not present where cameras are visible, and their presence and purpose are 
announced."226 However, generally speaking, there is no interference with privacy 
principle 3(a) where the (secret) recording, filming, or photographing of the 
individual occurs in a public place ("the public place exemption") or where the 
"public interest" defence applies.227 
223 MacDonald v The Radio Network Ltd (6 May 2004) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
2004-047 . 
224 Black v The Radio Network Ltd (2 I January 1998) Broadcasting Standards Authority 1999-003 
[Black]; Price, above n 219, I I 7; Elizabeth Owen "Why the Public Does Not eed a Tort of 
Intrusion to Ensure Protection from the Media" (LLB(J--lons) Seminar Paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2009). 
225 Balfour v Television New Zealand Ltd (2 I March 2006) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
2005-129 [Balfour]. 
226 Price, above n 219,119. 
227 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3, pnvacy 
principles 3(b), 8, reproduced in Appendix B (emphasis added). 
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(i) Public place exemption 
Privacy principle 3(b) provides a presumption that no intrusion is given, 
where the individual concerned is in a public place. As a matter of fact, there are 
no general restrictions on photographing or writing about what happens in a 
public place228 (note that the secret listening of a private conversation in a public 
place and the broadcast of the information was found to be in breach of the 
privacy standard). 229 Consequently, in Davies v Television New Zealand Ltd, the 
BSA "has generally accepted that filming people in a public place without their 
consent does not amount to a breach of privacy.•>23o In contrary, where the filming, 
or photographing takes place from a public place, but the material concerns 
something that happens in a private place, it is difficult to accept that the "public 
place exemption" applies. 231 "The [BSA] does not consider the position where the 
camera operator was standing is relevant."232 However, precedents from the BSA 
are inconsistent, as in Wilton v Television New Zealand Ltd, the BSA stated (after 
having found a breach of privacy principle 1 justified in the public interest) that 
"the [BSA] accepts that filming people in or from a public place without their 
consent does not, other than in limited circumstances, amount to a breach of 
privacy."233 I think that the crucial point is whether something that happens in a 
private place can be seen from a public place (lack of visual protection, 
insufficient fence). 
228 Black, above n 224; NZLC SP 19, above n 166, para 8.66. 
229 Black, above n 224. 
230 Davies v Television New Zealand Ltd (3 June 2005) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
2005-017 ( emphasis added) . 
23 1 Price, above n 219, 112-1 I 3; Radford v Television New Zealand Ltd (27 February 2003) 
Broadcasting Standards Authority 2003-0 I 7 [Radford]; contrast: Wilton v Television New Zealand 
Ltd (30 September 2004) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2004- I I 7 / 118 [ Wilton]. 
232 Radford, above n 231 , para 28. 
233 Wilton , above n 231 , para 18 ( emphasis added) . 
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(ii) Public interest defence 
The public interest defence applies to all privacy complaints and is defined 
as "legitimate concern or interest to the public."234 A "general interest or curiosity 
to the public" is insufficient,235 and there is also a difference between "matters 
which are in the public interest, and matters which are simply of interest to the 
public."236 It is essential that the matter concerns or affects a substantial part of 
the New Zealand population. 237 Consequently, "the 'need for pictures' will rarely, 
if ever, be enough alone to justify a privacy invasion."238 A purely sensational 
footage lacking any public interest might result in a breach of privacy 
principles.239 However, "the character and conduct of public figures ... is likely to 
be of public interest."240 The BSA expressly considered the role of public figures , 
and stated that people "who are experienced in public life and involved in issues 
of high public interest, can be expected to deal with robust persistence on the part 
of the media that might otherwise be unacceptable ."24 1 
234 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3, privacy 
principle 8, reproduced in Appendix B. 
235 NM v Television New Zealand Ltd (27 June 2007) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2007-023; 
Drury et al v TV3 ( I O October 1996) Broadcasting Standards Authority 1996-130. 
236 Balfour, above n 225, para 56. 
237 Ibid , para 58. 
238 Price, above n 219, I 15 . 
239 Balfour, above n 225 , para 63. 
240 Price,aboven219, 115. 
241 Laws, above n 8 (emphasis added). 
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(iii) Broadcasting Act 1989 v Tort of breach of privacy 
Note that any failure to comply with the standards is not subject to civil 
liability. 242 However, in Andrews v TVNZ, the High Court acknowledged that 
section 4(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1989 "does not operate to prohibit the 
bringing of a proceeding in tort" and that "a strong case in tort ... will in many (if 
not most) cases also constitute a breach of a provision in an approved code of 
broadcasting practice."243 Such an approach is consequent, as "there is no logic ... 
which would leave [celebrities] able to sue for breach of privacy occurring in 
print, but not by way of broadcast,"244 especially given the fact that the BSA has 
limited power to award compensation (up to $5000 and costs).245 
2. The New Zealand Press Council 
(a) About the New Zealand Press Council 
The print media (including their corresponding websites) are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the New Zealand Press Council (NZPC).246 The NZPC is an 
independent self-regulatory body, set up by the industry, dealing with complaints 
about the editorial content of a publication and promoting the freedom of the 
press. 247 The NZPC provides 13 principles (accuracy, privacy, children and young 
people, photographs and others) which are much briefer than the standards by the 
BSA. Although the principles address privacy issues, the NZPC can not award 
242 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4(3). 
243 Andrews, above n 159, para 98. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Broadcasting Act 1989, ss 13 , 16. 
246 Complain www.presscouncil.org.nz (accessed 20 July 2009). 
247 New Zealand Press Council www.presscouncil.org.nz (accessed 20 July 2009). 
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compensation. 248 The NZPC "makes findings and expects media against which 
findings have been made to publish them."249 Note that, in contrary to the BSA 
regime, there is no right to appeal a decision and the NZPC requires an 
"undertaking that, having referred the matter to the Press Council, [the 
complainant] will not take or continue proceedings against the publication or 
journalist concerned"250 in order to "avoid the possibility of the Press Council 
adjudication being used as a 'trial run' for litigation"251 establishing an exclusivity 
between references to the NZPC and court proceedings. 
(b) The principles 
The NZPC acknowledges that the freedom of expression is the most 
important principle and that "freedom of expression and public interest will play 
dominant roles."252 However, according to principle 3 of the Press Council 
Principles "everyone is entitled to privacy of person, space and personal 
information, and these rights should be respected by publications"253 (subject to 
the public interest of the publication). Generally speaking, celebrities have a 
"lower expectation of privacy"254 and there is no interference with principle 3, 
where photographs of public figures in public places are taken and published 
(relating to a current event).255 However, where the publication does not concern 
248 Complain, above n 246. 
249 NZLC SP 19, above n I 66, para 8.63; New Zealand Press Council Principles , principle I 3. 
25° Complaints Procedure www.presscouncil.org.nz (accessed 20 July 2009). 
251 Ibid . 
252 New Zealand Press Council Principles, preamble. 
253 Ibid, principle 3. 
254 Price, above n 49, 367. 
255 Ibid, 365,371. 
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the public role, there might be a breach of principle 3.256 Principle 11 requJres 
editors to "take care in photographic and image selection and treatment."
257 
3. Time for a change! 
It is doubtful whether the separate treatment of the BSA and the NZPC is 
still justified. For instance, the NZPC can not award damages.258 Individuals 
concerned that lodge a complain with the NZPC are refrained from taking or 
continuing any proceedings in courts against the publication, such as claiming 
damages under the tort of breach of privacy. 259 Individuals claiming a breach of 
the privacy standard of the Free-to-Air Television Code seem to be better 
protected than the individuals challenging a publication in a newspaper. In 
Andrews v TVNZ, the High Court acknowledged that section 4(3) of the 
Broadcasting Act 1989 "does not operate to prohibit the bringing of a proceeding 
in tort"260 enabling individuals to lodge a complaint with the BSA and to claim 
damages in courts. There might be instances where the decision whether to 
publish a photograph in the print media or to broadcast it on television is random. 
The existence of different regulatory regimes for the broadcast and print media 
"has historical origins, and dates back to a time when broadcast media needed a 
warrant to use the airwaves."26 1 "As the traditional media become less dominant, 
privacy intrusions will increasingly be carried out for the purpose of putting 
material on websites rather than printing or broadcasting it. Internet content is, 
256 Complaint v The Dominion Post (August 2006) New Zealand Press Council 1059; Ibid, 367. 
257 New Zealand Press Council Principles, principle 11. 
258 Complain, above n 246 . 
259 Complaints Procedure, above n 250. 
260 Andrews, above n 159, para 98 . 
261 NZLC SP 19, above n 166, para 8.64. 
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however, largely unregulated."262 The NZPC deals with websites only where there 
is a corresponding offline publication. However, the BSA is not responsible for a 
broadcaster's website. Hence, in the modern world and digital era we are living in 
the question is not ( or no more) whether the difference between the broadcast and 
print media is still justified and whether there is a need for a new body regulating 
the internet, such as The Internet Standards Authority or The New Zealand 
Internet Council but whether there should be one common regulatory body, such 
as a general news authority. The internet is nothing more than another form of 
publication. Generally speaking, the BSA 's standards and NZPC's principles 
address the content of the broadcast and publication respectively and are not 
specific to the form of publication. It can also be said that both the BSA 's 
standards and the NZPC's principles address similar issues (it is believed that a 
new body responsible for online publications would adopt similar principles). As 
a matter of fact, it is not about the medium itself (there is no different degree of 
breach of privacy rights just because the details have been broadcast and not 
published in the newspapers). Hence, it seems reasonable to introduce a general 
news authority providing a comprehensive protection (of privacy rights) under 
one roof regardless of the medium and form of publication respectively. 
c. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
1. The freedom of expression 
Section 14 of the BoRA provides that "everyone has the freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to ... impart infonnation ... of any kind in any 
262 New Zealand Law Commission issues Paper 14 - invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies. 
Review of the law of Privacy Stage 3 (Wellington, 2009) [NZLC IP 14] , paras 12.8. 
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form. ''263 The freedom of expression includes the freedom of the media and 
consequently the freedom to report on private lives of public people and to 
publish corresponding photographs. 264 The media can decide on "the cases they 
will cover and the content of that coverage, presumably influenced by such things 
as viewers' [and readers'] likely interest and available resources."265 In Moonen v 
Film & Literature Board of Review (Moonen), the Court of Appeal accepted that 
the freedom of expression is "as wide as human thought and imagination.''266 It 
includes information and ideas "that shock, offend or disturb.''267 
2. Values underlying the freedom of expression 
The most important values deemed to be protected by the freedom of 
expression are, inter alia, the promotion of truth ("marketplace of ideas")268 and 
the importance of the free speech for a democratic society and the "self-
fulfilment"269 of the individual.270 It has been accepted, however, that some 
categories of speech have more value than others and hence some kinds of speech 
are more protected than others. Scholars and courts distinguish between high-
value, mid-value, and low-value speech (such as the disclosure of private facts of 
263 See also: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 29, art 19. 
264 See generally: NZLC SP 19, above n I 66, para 8.47; NZLC SP 15, above n 173, para 4.58. 
265 TVNZ v Green (11 July 2008) HC WN CIV 2008-485-24 [TVNZ v Green], para 38. 
266 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 ZLR 9 (CA) [Moonen]. 
267 Browne v Canwest TV Works Ltd [2008] 1 ZLR 654 (HC) [Browne v Canwest], para 49 
quoting Otto-Preminger-lnstitut v Austria [1994] ECHR 26, para 49. 
268 Geiringer, above n 218, 320. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
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celebrities).271 "The importance of the value of the freedom of expression ... will 
be related to the extent of legitimate public concern in the information 
publicised."272 It has been accepted that there is a difference between something 
that is in the public interest and something that is "merely interesting to the 
public."273 For instance, reports on the latest relationship of a public figure are not 
as valuable for a democratic society as a press release by the Prime Minister of 
New Zealand. 
3. Limitations on the freedom of expression 
However, the freedom of expression is not absolute.274 "Freedom of 
expression must accommodate other values which society regards as 
important."275 According to section 5 of the BoRA the freedom of expression is 
subject "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society." As a matter of fact, section 5 of the 
BoRA sets out "two hoops"276 for a limitation on the freedom of expression to be 
deemed to be BoRA-consistent: the limitation must be prescribed by law and be 
reasonably and demonstrably justified. "[T]he loss to the free speech ought not to 
be greater than the gain for the competing rights and interests served by the 
speech-limiting law."277 "The more value to society the information imparted or 
271 See generally: Ibid , 322. 
272 Hosking, above n 152, para 132. 
273 TV3 v BSA, above n 209, 733; Hosking, above 11 152, 133 . 
274 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
275 Hosking, above n 152, para 230 Tipping J concurring. 
276 Geiringer, above 11 218, 31 7. 
277 Ibid, 319. 
54 
the type of expression in question may posses, the heavier will be the task of 
showing that the limitation is reasonable and justified."278 
In R v Hansen, the Supreme Court of New Zealand addressed the 
interrelationship between sections 5 and 6 of the BoRA (section 6 of the BoRA 
says that wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with 
the rights and freedoms of the BoRA, that meaning is to be preferred) and held 
that consistency in terms of section 6 of the BoRA means consistency with section 
5 of the BoRA (limits imposed must be reasonably and demonstrably justified) 
placing section 5 of the BoRA at the centre of the analysis. 279 
Limitations on the freedom of expression that can arise include: the tort of 
breach of privacy, the Broadcasting Act 1989, codes and standards, and the 
principles provided by the NZPC. 
(a) The tort of breach of privacy 
In contrast to the freedom of expression, there is no codification of a 
general right to privacy.280 The only privacy-related provision is section 21 of the 
BoRA dealing with unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, in Hosking, 
Keith J and Anderson P denied the existence of the tort of privacy and held that 
such a tort "cannot be demonstrably justified as a restriction on the freedom of 
278 Hosking, above n 152, para 235 Tipping J concurring. 
279 R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR I (SC) [R v Hansen] ; see generally: Geiringer, above n 218, 303. 
280 See for international protection: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 
29, art 17; Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 29, art 16. 
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expression."281 However, the majority held that a tort of privacy exists justifying a 
restriction on freedom of expression.282 Privacy rights "are recognised less 
directly, but no less significantly, in provisions such as [ section 21 of the Bo RA] 
... that right is not very far from an entitlement to be free from unreasonable 
intrusions into personal privacy. "283 
Although the BoRA does not explicitly provide a general privacy right, the 
majority's approach in Hosking is preferable. Accepting that the tort of privacy 
can justify a restriction on freedom of expression is consistent with section 28 of 
the BoRA. 284 Hence, an image infringing privacy rights could reasonably and 
demonstrably justify a restriction of media ' s freedom of expression. However, 
whether the limitations placed on the freedom of expression are deemed to be 
justified limitations under section 5 of the BoRA ought to be assessed on a case-
by-case decision. The crucial point is whether privacy values outweigh the values 
underlying the freedom of expression in the individual case (which is the case 
where the test under Hosking is met). Case law suggests that prescribed by law 
under section 5 of the BoRA includes the limits imposed by the common law and 
where privacy values are deemed to outweigh the freedom of expression it will be 
a reasonable and demonstrable justified limitation. 285 
In his concurring judgement in Hosking, Tipping J addressed the privacy 
values involved, such as the protection of personal dignity and wellbeing, and 
accepted that: 286 
281 Hosking, above n 152, paras 175-222, 262-271. 
282 Ibid , paras 77-90. 
283 Hosking, above n 152, para 224 Tipping J concurring. 
284 ew Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 28; see generally: Burrows, above n 149, 646; NZLC 
SPl9, above n 166, paras 29, 8.13. 
285 Hosking, above n 152, paras 237, 251-254 Tipping J concurring. 
286 Ibid, para 238 Tipping J concurring. 
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Privacy is potentially a very wide concept; but, for present purposes, it can be 
described as the right to have people leave you alone if you do not want some 
aspects of your private life to become public property. 
Tipping J also accepted that the public has a legitimate right to know, up to 
a point, certain information about public figures and the line has to be drawn at 
the "unfair and unnecessary public disclosure of private facts.''287 Hence, where 
the test for the tort of breach of privacy is not met, requiring a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a highly offensiveness of the publication, any 
limitations on the freedom of expression will be deemed to be unjustified. 
(b) The Broadcasting Act 1989, codes and standards 
The Broadcasting Act 1989 and the codes of broadcasting practice 
respectively require that programme standards are consistent with "the privacy of 
the individual."288 Both the BSA and the courts accepted on several occasions that 
not only the requirements contained in the Broadcasting Act 1989 but also the 
standards contained in the codes of broadcasting standards (imposing limits on the 
broadcasters on what, when, and how to say something) are limitations prescribed 
by law.289 The Broadcasting Act 1989 authorises the BSA to issue and approve 
codes of broadcasting practice. 29° Consequently, the standards set out in the 
respective codes of broadcasting practice are limitations prescribed by law. 
The second hoop of the test under section 5 of the BoRA (reasonably and 
demonstrably justified) requires a proportionality exercise. This balancing 
287 Ibid, para 239 Tipping J concurring. 
288 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4( 1 )(c); Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice and 
Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3. 
289 See generally: TVNZ v Green, above n 265. 
290 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 21. 
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exercise requires an analysis of the values underlying the freedom of expression, 
the values underlying the privacy standard and the degree to which the 
corresponding values are engaged in the particular instance.291 The BSA held that 
the limitations imposed by the Broadcasting Act 1989 itself "are reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."292 
(i) Values underlying the privacy standard 
As already discussed, the BoRA does not protect a general right to privacy 
per se. However, New Zealand courts have accepted a tort of breach of privacy. 
Likewise, international law requires a protection of individual ' s privacy rights . 293 
"The real goal of the privacy standard is to protect individuals from unwarranted 
harm to their dignity."294 Indeed, the BSA takes breaches of the privacy standard 
seriously and, generally speaking, gives children ' s special role due regard. 295 The 
BSA has developed a list of privacy principles which are part of the Free-to-Air 
Television Code and the Radio Code (the limitations involved are prescribed by 
law in terms of section 5 of the BoRA).296 For instance, privacy principle 6 of the 
Free-to-Air Television Code and the Radio Code take children ' s special need of 
protection into account by expressly mentioning "children ' s vulnerability" and 
291 Geiringer, above n 2 18, 319 . 
292 Radford, above n 231 , para 30; McDonald et al v TVNZ (6 June 2002) Broadcasting Standards 
Authority 2002-071, paras 100-109 . 
293 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 29, art 17; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child , above n 29, arts 16, 40(2)(vii) . 
294 Geiringer, above n 218, 334. 
295 JB v TVNZ (22 February 2007) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2006-090; Commissioner f or 
Children et al v TVNZ (15 July 1999) Broadcasting Standards Authority 1999-093; contrast: 
Department of Child, Youth and Family Services v TV3 ( 18 September 2003) Broadcasting 
Standards Authority 2003-107; see generally : Geiringer, above n 21 8, 333. 
296 Geiringer, above n 218, 333 . 
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"chi Id's privacy. ''297 Broadcasters are required to act in the children's best interest 
(regardless of any given consent). 298 The BSA notes that the privacy principles 
contained in the codes "are not necessarily the only privacy principles that the 
Authority will apply"299 and that "the principles may well require elaboration and 
refinement when applied to a complaint."300 Given the possible chilling effect on 
the freedom of speech, however, "the BSA ought to be extremely careful about 
upholding breaches of privacy that fall outside the 'privacy principles' that it has 
developed."301 I agree with Claudia Geiringer and Stephen Price that when the 
BSA does so, it ought to apply an extremely high threshold in the name of the 
freedom of expression.302 
(ii) Balancing the freedom of expression against the right to privacy 
The question whether the pnvacy standard has been breached and the 
order made in a particular instance are reasonable and demonstrable limitations 
imposed on the freedom of expression must be assessed on a case-by-case 
decision (public figure, public place, harm done, type of information published, 
class of speech, value of information, children's interest, consent, and time, place 
and manner of intrusion). 303 Scholars provided a "mental checklist" aiming at 
assisting when conducting the balancing exercise.304 Relevant factors include the 
297 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3, pnvacy 
principle 6. 
298 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice and Radio Code of Broadcasting Practice, 
broadcasting standard 3, privacy principles 5-7. 
299 Ibid , privacy principles. 
3oo Ibid . 
301 Geiringer, above n 218, 333. 
302 Ibid. 
303 See generally: Ibid , 335-337. 
304 Ibid, 337-338. 
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promotion of the objectives underlying the pnvacy standard if upholding a 
complaint. Which right prevails is "in every case a matter of degree depending on 
the relevant time, place and circumstances."305 Generally speaking, the BSA 
"weigh[ s J privacy, and especially children's privacy, heavily in the balance. "306 
(c) The New Zealand Press Council principles 
Although the NZPC provides principles dealing, inter alia, with the 
protection of the privacy of the individual, the NZPC is a self-regulatory body. As 
a matter of fact, I suggest that the limitations on the freedom of expression 
resulting from the application of the principles provided by the NZPC are not 
justified limitations under section 5 of the BoRA. The NZPC's principles regime 
is based on self-regulation and so the limitations are not prescribed by law. The 
privacy-related issues addressed by the NZPC are, however, similar to the privacy 
principles established by the BSA (which are deemed to be limitations prescribed 
by law). 
4. The Broadcasting Standards Authority's and the courts' approach to the 
Bill of Rights Act I 990 
The BSA 's approach to the BoRA has not been constant over the years. 
Generally speaking, the BSA has used a standard clause ("boilerplate")307 stating 
that it has given full weight to the provisions of the BoRA and that the decision is 
305 Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC) [Brooker v Police], para I 33 ( emphasis added). 
306 The Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Bill of Rights www.medialawjoumal.co.nz 
(accessed 8 October 2009). 
307 Geiringer, above n 218, 297. 
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consistent with the BoRA.308 Such an unsystematic approach lacks any balancing 
exercise not giving due regard to the vital importance of the freedom of 
expression and the impact on the broadcasters. Although it seems that the BSA 
has accepted the need for a change, recent decisions show an extended analysis of 
section 5 of the BoRA and the proportionality test,309 its new approach is not a 
standardised procedure yet. Some decisions include again, especially when 
making orders in an individual instance, nothing more than the use of a (slightly 
changed) standard clause.31° Courts have criticised the BSA' s use of a standard 
clause lacking any analysis of section 5 of the BoRA. 311 
Courts adopted a more systematic approach to the BoRA and are providing 
a more BoRA-focussed analysis. Decisions show an extended analysis of the 
competing rights and balancing exercise involved. 312 However, it was not until 
2007 that the Supreme Court of New Zealand provided an extensive interpretation 
of the relevant BoRA provisions31 3 (it seems that the Supreme Court overruled the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Moonen). 314 Courts have always 
struggled and still do with the interrelationship between and the interpretation of 
sections 5 and 6 of the BoRA. ln Browne v Canwest TV Works Ltd, the High Court 
acknowledged that the "freedom of expression jurisprudence is still in an 
308 See generally: Smith v TVNZ (26 May 2008) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2008-018 
[Smith v TVNZJ, para 27. 
309 See generally: Pryde v Radio New Zealand Ltd (27 August 2008) Broadcasting Standards 
Authority 2008-040; Commerce Commission v TVWorks Ltd (2 October 2008) Broadcasting 
Standards Authority 2008-014. 
310 Rw v Radioworks Ltd (17 February 2009) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2008-111, para 23; 
Smith v TVNZ, above n 308. 
3I I TVNZ v KW, above n 176, paras 19, 98. 
312 See generally: TVNZ v Green, above n 265, paras 60-63; Brooker v Police, above n 305. 
313 R v Hansen , above n 279. 
314 Moonen, above n 266; see generally: Geiringer, above n 2 I 8,312. 
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embryonic state."315 This might explain the BSA 's unsystematic and random 
approach to the BoRA. There has not been much guidance from the courts and 
often it is a matter of degree.316 
However, generally speaking, both the BSA and the courts accepted the 
importance of the freedom of expression. What is needed is consistency: "an 
explicit identification of the values underlying the freedom of speech, the values 
underlying the [competing privacy rights], and the extent to which each is 
implicated in the particular case. "317 
D. Children's Position 
The current situation between the New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
approach differs significantly in relation to children ' s position in the media (while 
the approach taken in the United Kingdom is consistent with the situation in 
Germany). In Murray, accepting that a child might have a different reasonable 
expectation than its famous parents, the English court stated that:318 
If a child of parents who are not in the public eye could reasonably expect not to 
have photographs of him [her] published in the media, so too should the child of a 
famous parent. In our opinion it is at least arguable that a child of ' ordinary ' 
parents could reasonably expect that the press would not target him [her] and 
publish photographs of him [her]. The same is true of David, especially since on 
the alleged facts here the photograph would not have been taken or published if he 
had not been the son of JK Rowling . 
315 Browne v Canwest, above n 267, para 28. 
316 Brooker v Police, above n 305 , para l 33 quoting Wain wright v Police [ 1968] NZLR IOI (CA); 
see generally : The Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Bill of Rights , above n 306. 
317 Geiringer, above n 218, 3 16. 
318 Murray, above n 34, paras 14, 46. 
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Interestingly, the court seems to be concerned with the lack of choice of a 
child of famous parents to be in the public eye and applies a different approach 
than the one relevant for adults. 31 9 In addition to the standard criteria relevant for 
the test whether an adult has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the test relevant 
for a child includes the question "how [their private life] has in fact been 
conducted by those responsible for [their] welfare and upbringing."320 It is crucial 
whether their parents "courted publicity by procuring the publication of 
photographs of the child in order to promote their own interests"321 or "have taken 
care to keep their children out of the public gaze."322 
Decisions by the British Press Complaints Commission (PCC) pre-Murray 
suggest, however, a different approach. Principle 3 of the Code of Practice (the 
Code) accepts, inter alia, subject to public interest, that "everyone [including 
children] is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life" and "it is 
unacceptable to photograph individuals in private places without their consent" 
noting that "private places are public or private property where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy."323 In addition, principle 6 of the Code of 
Practice says, inter alia, prohibiting interviews and photographs affecting 
children's welfare, that the press "must not use the fame, notoriety or position of a 
parent or guardian as sole justification for publishing details of a child's private 
life" (subject to public interest).324 Celebrities, such as actress A Kingston, lodged 
complaints with the PCC alleging a breach of the principles provided by the Code 
of Practice. The photographs showed their children in public places (public road, 
shopping mall). The PCC declined to accept that "public roads or pavements were 
3 19 See generally: Campbel!, above n 6; Peck, above n 30. 
320 Murray, above n 34, para 37 . 
321 Ibid, para 38. 
322 Ibid. 
323 United Kingdom Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice, principle 3(i)(iii). 
324 Ibid, principle 6(v) . 
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places where people [including children] could have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy"325 (regardless of the use of long lens photography in such an instance): 
"[T]he mere publication of a child's image cannot breach the Code when it is 
taken in a public place and is unaccompanied by any private details or material 
that might embarrass or inconvenience the child."326 
Interestingly, in M Donald v Hello! Magazine, a case (almost identical 
with the facts in Hosking and Murray) concerning the publication of photographs 
of Ms Donald's son sitting in a push-chair which were taken on a public street 
(the boy's aunt is a famous fashion designer), the PCC held that photographs 
taken in public places (without revealing any private details) do not affect the 
welfare of a child and denied a breach of the Code: "The photographs did not 
concern matters that could genuinely be considered to concern the child's private 
life or affect his welfare."327 
In J K Rowling v OK! Magazine, however, a complaint concerning the 
publication of photographs of J K Rowling's eight year old daughter at a access 
restricted-beach, the PCC expressly disapproved the "the use of long lens 
photography to take pictures of people in places where they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy"328 and stressed "the high level of protection afforded ... to 
eh i ldren. "329 
Although New Zealand courts seem to be aware of the need to protect 
children,330 in Hosking, the court did not differentiate between adults and children 
325 A Kingston et al v Hello ' Maga::ine (2001) Press Complaints Commission 55. 
326 Ibid. 
327 M Donald et al v Hello! Magazine (2000) Press Complaints Commission 52. 
328 J K Rowling v OK! Magazine (200 I) Press Complaints Commission 56. 
329 Ibid. 
330 TV3 Network Services Ltd v ECPAT New Zealand Inc [2003] ZAR 501 , para 43; Re an 
Unborn Child[2003] 1 NZLR 115. 
and held that, generally speaking, "it is a matter of human nature that interest in 
the lives of public figures also extends to interest in the lives of their families" 
accepting a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy of the family. 331 
According to Hosking the standard two step-test "provide[s] adequate flexibility 
to accommodate the special vulnerability of children."332 I must respectfully admit 
that it is doubtful whether the test under Hosking is flexible enough to consider 
children's special position. It merely says that where no reasonable expectation of 
privacy is given (in a public place), the publication does not give rise to a tort of 
breach of privacy not revealing any flexibility. The court did not see any "real risk 
of physical harm."333 It seems that the Court of Appeal in Hosking adopted the 
approach taken by the PCC pre-Murray.334 
However, privacy principle 6 of the Free-to-Air Television Code and the 
Radio Code take children's special need of protection into account by expressly 
mentioning "children's vulnerability" and "child's privacy."335 Similarly, principle 
5 of the Press Council Principles provides that "[ e ]ditors should have particular 
care and consideration for reporting on and about children and young people."336 
Indeed, the NZPC accepted that "in cases involving children, editors must 
331 Hosking, above n I 52, para 124. 
332 Ibid, para 145. 
333 Ibid, para 163. 
334 Ibid, para 169. 
335 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3, privacy 
principle 6; see also: JB v TVNZ (22 February 2007) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2006-090; 
Commissioner for Children et al v TVNZ (15 July 1999) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
1999-093; contrast: Department of Child, Youth and Family Services v TV3 (18 September 2003) 
Broadcasting Standards Authority 2003-107; see generally: Geiringer, above n 218, 333. 
336 New Zealand Press Council Principles, principle 5. 
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demonstrate an exceptional public interest to over-ride the normally paramount 
interest of the child"337 and held in relation to children of famous parents: 338 
The Press Council maintains that a public figure has every right to expect the 
privacy and self-respect of his or her young children to be protected, especially 
when there is no demonstrable justification for drawing the young person into 
the limelight. 
The approach taken in Murray ( children) is consistent with recent 
developments in Germany (children and adults). Hosking, however, was decided 
before Murray (and might have been influenced by the PCC). New Zealand courts 
might follow the (new) approach in the United Kingdom and reconsider the 
position of a child. 
E. A Need for a General Tort of Intrusion? 
The NZLC suggests the introduction of a general tort "of invasion of 
privacy by intrusion into a person 's solitude, seclusion or personal affairs" to 
protect individuals from the media:339 "Intrusion is distinct from disclosure of 
private facts because an intrusion may or may not reveal private facts .. . if it does, 
the person learning the private facts may or may not disclose them further."340 
Often invasion results from the intrusion, not from the disclosure.34 1 However, 
although the elements of the tort of intrusion are not clear yet (intentional 
337 New Zealand Press Council The 35th Report of the New Zealand Press Council (Wellington, 
2007) 12. 
338 Ibid , 13. 
339 See generally: ZLC IP 14, above n 262, para 11.30 and Owen, above n 224; see also: 
Submission by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on the Law Commission 's Issues Paper 
Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies (NZLC IP 14), above n 172. 
340 NZLC IP14, above n 262, para 11.2. 
341 Price, above n 219, 107; Owen, above n 224. 
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intrusion, solitude or seclusion, reasonable expectation of pnvacy, highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person, public interest), 342 it is doubtful 
whether the tort generally applies in public places. 343 lt might be true that media's 
"increasingly invasive reporting style"344 has contributed to today's increased 
awareness and invasion of privacy rights and the need for a comprehensive 
protection of privacy, but most of the situations where intrusion is at issue are 
already covered by existing statutes, torts, and avenues: 345 Harassment Act 1997 
("journalists or photographers who persistently hound people (including by 
accosting them or contacting them multiple times") ,346 Crimes Act 1961,347 tort of 
privacy (tort of disclosure), tort of trespass (subject to a "sufficient right of 
exclusive possession of the land concerned"348 and a physical intrusion on the 
land of the individual concerned),349 tort of nuisance (where a substantial intrusion 
interferes with the use or enjoyment of the land, such as persistent harassment, 
surveillance, filming, and taking of photographs),350 and BSA's and NZPC's 
privacy principles (subject to a story being broadcast or published).35 1 
I must admit that there are some existing gaps in the coverage of existing 
law. Corresponding gaps of protection might refer to situations where the 
342 NZLC IP 14, above n 262, paras l l.37-11.45. 
343 Ibid , paras 11.44-11.45 . 
344 NZLC SP19, above n 166, para 8.60. 
345 Owen, above n 224. 
346 Harassment Act 1997, ss 3, 4, 8; Media harassment www.medialawjoumal.co.nz (accessed 20 
July 2009). 
347 Crimes Act 1961 , ss 2 I 6A-2 l 6F (interception devices), 2 l 6G-2 l 6N (intimate visual 
recordings) . 
348 Bradley, above n 154, para 25. 
349 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3ed, Brookers, Wellington, 200 I) 912. 
350 Bernstein v Skyviews Ltd [ 1978] I QB 479; Owen, above n 53. 
35 1 Free-to-Air Television Code of Broadcasting Practice, broadcasting standard 3, privacy 
principle 3(a); New Zealand Press Council Privacy Principles, principle 3; see a lso: New Zealand 
Press Council Privacy Principles, principle 9 (subterfuge). 
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intrusion occurs through surveillance (from a public place), the act at issue is a 
one-off situation (although the Harassment Act 1997 includes watching and 
loitering near a person's place of residence the act requires a pattern of behaviour 
that includes doing any specified act on at least two separate situations within 12 
months),352 the individual concerned is not naked or engaged in any intimate 
activity (the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act 1961 apply only to covert 
visual recordings, such as a photograph or a videotape, of a place with a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and where the individual concerned is naked or 
engaged in intimate activities),353 and the intrusion does not reveal any private 
facts or any gathered (private) information are not disclosed ( either by means of 
broadcast or publication in newspapers or magazines and where the tort of breach 
of privacy or the BSA ' sand NZPC's privacy principles do not apply). This might 
be the case where a photographer, for the first time, climbs up a public tree for the 
purpose of taking a photograph of a well known actress laying in her garden 
(using telescopic lenses) but not publishing the photographs or simply watches the 
actress . 354 Yet another possible gap might exist where the photographer is not a 
professional photographer with no intention whatsoever to publish any gathered 
information (in this instance, however, the individual concerned might lodge a 
complaint with the Privacy Commissioner under the Privacy Act 1993)355 or 
where a reporter goes through the rubbish bin (located on a public street) of a 
public figure for the purpose of obtaining newsworthy information.356 
It seems clear that corresponding instances are unlikely and the gaps at 
issue not serious enough to justify an additional general tort of intrusion. In 
addition, generally speaking, it can be said that where information on celebrities 
352 Harassment Act 1997, ss 3, 4. 
353 Crimes Act 1961 , s 216G. 
354 See generally: NZLC SPl9, above n 166, para 8.102. 
355 Privacy Act 1993, ss 66, 67. 
356 See generally: NZLC IP14, above n 262, paras 11.19. 
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has been gathered, the information will be published or broadcast. It seems 
unlikely that an substantive intrusion, meeting the test for a general tort of 
intrusion, occurs without a subsequent disclosure of the gathered information. 
Where the information gathered upon intrusion will not be disclosed, the torts of 
trespass and nuisance might remedy the individual concerned. In addition, privacy 
principle 3(a) of the codes expressly addresses the intentional interference, "in the 
nature of prying, with that individual's interest in solitude or seclusion" (subject 
to disclosure). It might be true that:357 
There are a number of features of the current media environment that could have 
implications for privacy . .. commercia l pressures to report on celebrity gossip, 
scandal and dramatic events such as accidents or murders may lead to the use of 
increasingly intrusive methods of gathering material, and more extensive prying 
into people's private lives . .. 
However, generally speaking, commercial pressure means also that there 
will be a con-esponding publication or broadcast of the relevant facts and the tort 
of breach of privacy and the BSA' s and NZPC' s privacy principles will apply. 
In addition, cun-ent figures suggest that a breach of privacy standards or 
principles respectively is not a major concern. Between July 2007 and June 2008 
only seven complaints out of 139 complaints lodged with the BSA dealt with the 
privacy standard (of which four were upheld). 358 ln terms of the complaints 
lodged with the NZPC only six complaints out of 43 complaints dealt with an 
alleged breach of the privacy principle (in 2008).359 Hence, I think that, overall, 
the coverage of existing law is adequate. As a matter of fact, New Zealand courts 
have not adopted a con-esponding tort of intrusion.360 
357 Ibid , paras 12.8. 
358 Broadcasting Standards Authority Annual Report 2008 (Wellington, 2008). 
359 New Zealand Press Council www.presscouncil.org.nz (accessed 20 July 2009). 
360 See generally: Owen, above n 224. 
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I rather suggest to adapt existing criminal offences or civil remedies. It 
seems reasonable to question whether the high threshold under Hosking 
(publication must be highly offensive) is still justified due to changes in society's 
perception of privacy and in light of today's reality television culture 
( corresponding developments seem to justify a change of the threshold from 
highly offensive to offensive). In addition, it seems preferable to question the 
efficiency of BSA 's and NZPC's (limited) powers and the Jack of an authority or 
council for online publications are also questionable. As a matter of fact, the BSA 
has the power to award compensation merely up to $5000,361 and the NZPC has 
no power at all to award compensation. However, most importantly, the BSA 
expects public figures to deal with "robust persistence on the part of the media 
that might otherwise be unacceptable."362 
IV. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 
A. The European Context 
The approach taken by the New Zealand courts differs significantly from 
the situation in Germany. Note that German privacy law has been influenced by 
the ECHR and the ECtHR. In Germany, the ECHR has the status as national law. 
This means, generally speaking, that the convention is binding for the 
interpretation of the individual state law but not for the interpretation of the Basic 
Law. However, the FCC accepted that both national law and the Basic Law has to 
be interpreted in light of the ECHR.363 Before the landmark judgement by the 
ECtHR in 2004 German courts used to apply a pro-paparazzi approach and grant 
361 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 13. 
362 Laws, above n 8. 
363 Gorgiilii (14 October 2004) Federal Constitutional Court 2 BvR 1481 /04, para 30; "Standards 
of constitutional law applying to the admissibility of photojournalism concerning the private and 
everyday life of celebrities", above n I 2. 
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protection in public places only upon seclusion. In of Hannover, however, the 
ECtHR overruled that approach and asked for the application of the legitimate 
expectation of privacy test and a case-by-case decision. Although the decisions by 
the ECtHR are not absolutely binding, national courts are obliged to take 
ECtHR' s decisions into consideration and to justify any dissenting opinions. As a 
matter of fact, case law post ECtHR' s landmark judgement shows a different 
approach, namely a trend towards more protection of public figure's privacy 
rights (for adults and children) 364 whereas New Zealand courts are reluctant to 
accept privacy in public (neither for adults nor for children). 
B. Constitution v Common Law 
In addition, while privacy and media rights in Germany are protected by 
the constitution365 and the ECHR,366 privacy rights in New Zealand are based 
mainly on common law and merely the freedom of expression is protected under 
the BoRA. While in Germany the test to be applied seems to require a balancing 
exercise between the equally protected competing interests (and where acts, such 
as the CADA, exist addressing the balancing exercise between the competing 
interests), in New Zealand the starting point seems to be section 14 of the BoRA 
which is subject to limitations that are prescribed by law and reasonably and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, such as the tort of breach 
of privacy. 
364 Damm, above n 43, para 267. 
365 Basic Law, above n 38, arts l (I), 2( l ); Schacht-leserbrief, above n 15 . 
366 ECHR, above n 29, art 8. 
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c. Where from here? 
Just a few months after the death of the Princess of Wales the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe acknowledged that although 
"people's private lives have become a highly lucrative commodity for certain 
sectors of the media ... public figures must recognise that the special position they 
occupy in society ... in many cases by choice ... automatically entails increased 
pressure on their privacy."367 However, the ECtHR held that there is no right to 
take pictures of public people merely because they are in public places. 368 
Consequently, the German courts took a pro-celebrity approach and ruled that the 
protection of celebrities' private lives does not (no more) necessarily require 
seclusion (regardless of whether the publication concerns private facts).369 The 
German approach is, however, too formalistic and based on casuistry (general 
personality rights, right to control the use of the own image, right to privacy, 
spheres of protection, aspect of contemporary society, legitimate interest, ECHR, 
international instruments). 
It seems that New Zealand courts are not prepared, quite convincingly, to 
go as far as German courts and the ECtHR ruling that the publication of 
photographs showing celebrities, for instance, in a restaurant or in public 
shopping infringes their privacy rights and to accept a general case-by-case 
approach. 370 As a general and preferable rule, given the importance of the freedom 
of expression, in New Zealand "something that happens on a public street is 
unlikely to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy."37 1 However, New 
Zealand courts have accepted that there might be exceptions. "'In law, context is 
367 Council Resolution (EC) 1165/98 Right to Privacy, above n 50. 
368 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11. 
369 Casiraghi v RTL, above n 9. 
370 Of Hannover v Germany, above n 11 . 
371 Private in public and seclusion in company: Some new boundaries in the Law of Privacy, above 
n 165. 
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everything' . . . the same can be said of television and other media broadcasts or 
publications."372 Indeed, it seems that at the centre of the discussion are the 
contextual factors time, place, and manner of the intrusion and publication 
respectively. And as D J Solove said: 
[A]ny solution will be far from perfect, as we are dealing with a social tapestry 
of immense complexity, and the questions of how to modulate reputation, gossip, 
shame, privacy, norms, and free speech have confounded us for centuries. 
D. Children's Special Protection 
However, it seems reasonable to accept " the parents' wish . .. to protect the 
freedom of the children to live normal lives without the constant fear of media 
intrusion" and to object to photographs "taken for the purpose of publication for 
profit."373 As accepted in of Hannover and Murray, the danger involved is that 
excessive media intrusion might adversely affect the exercise of corresponding 
activities in the future. 374 Consequently, German courts have for a long time 
protected children from the media. New Zealand courts, however, do not see the 
need for protection of children when taking photographs of children in public 
places. However, Hosking was decided before Murray and New Zealand courts 
might follow the (new) approach in the United Kingdom (pro-children approach). 
372 Browne v Canwesl, above n 267, para 73 quoting R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] 2 AC 532, para 28 Lord Steyne. 
373 Murray, above n 34, para 50. 
374 Ibid, para 55; of Hannover v Germany , above n 11 , para 57. 
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E. Celebrity Culture in Germany and New Zealand 
The different approaches applied in the respective states might be due to 
the different celebrity culture. In Europe it seems to have an overwhelming 
number of tabloid magazines justifying a need for more protection of the 
individuals concerned. Although even in New Zealand there is a public interest in 
public figures' daily and private life and an increased emphasis on entertainment 
press and celebrity gossip ("it seems that 'the stories that generate the most hits 
online are often trashy/sleazy ones'),375 New Zealand media seems to be more 
responsible and prepared to respect individual's privacy rights. 376 As a matter of 
fact, it seems that the different degrees of protection give due regard to the 
different situations in Germany and New Zealand respectively. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to show that although some photographs of and 
reports on public figures raise some concerns, according to the approach taken in 
New Zealand, "something that happens on a public street is unlikely to give rise to 
a reasonable expectation of privacy."377 "Generally pictures taken in public are 
fair game,"378 although "journalism and privacy do not generally go hand in 
hand."379 Existing law and avenues provide sufficient protection of celebrities' 
privacy rights as "the mainstream New Zealand media tend to be responsible."380 
375 NZLC IPJ4, above n 262, paras 12.7. 
376 See generally: What is the biggest threat to media freedom m ew Zealand? 
www.privacy.org.nz (accessed 25 July 2009). 
377 Private in public and seclusion in company: Some new boundaries in the Law of Privacy, above 
n 165. 
378 Mike Hosking and Naomi Campbell develop privacy & confidentiality law, above n 187. 
379 What is the biggest threat to media freedom in New Zealand?, above n 376. 
380 Ibid; contrast: Kirwan-Jones, above n 201. 
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Hence, there is no need for a general tort of intrusion in New Zealand. In light of 
the importance of the freedom of expression the approach taken by the courts in 
New Zealand (providing some exemptions) is more preferable than the current 
one taken by German courts and developments in Europe (where adults are 
concerned). Still, there is a need to address children's special position and to 
reconsider the approach taken in Hosking. Insofar the situation in Germany is 
preferable. In principle, the relevant factors are time, place, and manner and the 
key seems to be responsible journalism. 
Generally speaking, I think that "compulsions to function in a certain way 
and ... the presence of the media"381 is part of the game. N Campbell "has given 
them stories to sell their papers and they have given her publicity to promote her 
career."382 Celebrities "cannot ... have it both ways."383 
38 1 Caroline 11, above n I 0, para 40. 
382 Campbell, above n 6, para 66. 
383 Raymond Wacks "'Private Facts ': Is Naomi Campbell a Good Model?" (2004) J SCRIPT-ed 
420,432. 
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